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JUDGING FOREIGN STATES
ZACHARY D. CLOPTON*
Famed foreign relations law principles, including the act of state
doctrine, the public law taboo, and Zschernig’s foreign affairs
preemption, rely on the notion that U.S. courts should not sit in judgment
on foreign states. Judges in these cases, as well as scholars writing in the
area, frequently suggest that U.S. courts should sit out of important
disputes due to considerations of sovereign equality and international
comity. Yet, in less attention-grabbing cases, U.S. courts routinely sit in
judgment on foreign judgments, laws, legal systems, and interests,
sometimes concluding that they do meet U.S. standards. The first goal of
this project, therefore, is to identify and catalog those circumstances in
which U.S. courts sit in judgment on foreign states. This extensive catalog
should cast doubt on unsystematic objections to sitting in judgment: Were
we to accept that sitting in judgment was per se impermissible, all sorts of
current doctrines would need to be revisited. Such a categorical rule is not
only radical, but also unjustified. The doctrines in which courts sit in
judgment are routine and unremarkable; they protect important
institutional and individual concerns; and they have not sparked
international incident. Nor is there a coherent distinction between the
doctrines that call for courts to sit in judgment and those that do not.
Identifying these issues does not determine a better approach, and
recent scholarship on these and related cases have proposed changes to
U.S. law that turn on external considerations such as foreign interests or
international comity. But this literature, in my view, risks focusing too
much on the transnational aspects of these cases to the exclusion of
domestic institutional concerns. As a potential corrective, this Article
imagines sitting-in-judgment doctrine that is responsive to those structural
factors that govern institutional arrangements within the U.S. system.
Applying the tools of comparative institutional analysis, cases could be
divided into those bilateral, legal, and constrained adjudications for which
the common-law courts were designed, versus those polycentric, systemic,
political inquiries best left to the political branches. Federalism, with
implications for both authority and capacity, would suggest further
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division of responsibilities among relevant institutions. And individualrights considerations would offer guidance to courts about how to sit in
judgment when called upon to do so. This analysis demonstrates not only
that there is no per se reason that U.S. institutions should avoid sitting in
judgment on foreign state acts, but also that current law may not be
allocating responsibility for sitting in judgment consistent with domestic
institutional considerations.
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“To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state
is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court . . . .”
—Judge Learned Hand1
I. INTRODUCTION
In a seemingly unremarkable 10-page opinion, the Eleventh Circuit in
May 2015 affirmed the dismissal of a human rights lawsuit filed against
various Venezuelan entities in part because the act of state doctrine bars
U.S. courts from sitting in judgment of a foreign state.2 Yet during the
period between the district court’s dismissal and the court of appeal’s
affirmance, district courts within the Eleventh Circuit issued more than
forty written opinions on forum non conveniens motions,3 which
canonically require the court to assess the adequacy of a foreign judicial
system.4
In March 2014, the Second Circuit refused to turn over $6.8 million
owed to the government of Brazil pursuant to a Brazilian penal judgment
because the court wanted to avoid passing upon the public law of another
state.5 Yet the same court ruled that Namibia’s United Nations mission
may be sued in tort based on its alleged failure to comply with the New
York City building code.6 More dramatically, the same court also affirmed
a district court judgment allowing a suit to proceed because “if the
plaintiffs returned to Iran to prosecute this claim, they would probably be
shot.”7
In February 2014, the District of Maryland dismissed Chinese
dissidents’ lawsuit against an American corporation and its officers for
complicity in China’s surveillance programs in part because the suit would
have required the court to sit in judgment on the acts of a foreign

1. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring), aff’d on other
grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
2. Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venez., 785 F.3d 545, 551–52 (11th Cir. 2015). For
further discussion of the act of state doctrine, see infra Part II.B.3.
3. See, e.g., Mootilal Ramhit & Sons Contracting, Ltd. v. Mohammed, 2014 WL 3439742 (S.D.
Fla. July 15, 2014) (dismissing case in favor of suit in Trinidad and Tobago). A full list can be
compiled from Westlaw by searching for the phrase “forum non conveniens” in district courts within
the Eleventh Circuit between December 30, 2013 and May 7, 2015.
4. See infra notes 97–99, 109–110 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Federative Republic of Braz., 748 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2014). See infra notes
33–41 and accompanying text (discussing the public law taboo).
6. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Namib., 681 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.
2012).
7. Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 767 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1985).
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government.8 Yet only a few weeks before defendants filed their motion to
dismiss,9 the same district court stayed enforcement of a Nigerian
judgment to permit a defendant to proffer evidence that the judgment was
obtained by fraud, the cause of action was repugnant to Maryland’s public
policy, and the Nigerian legal system failed to provide impartial tribunals
or procedures compatible with due process.10
These sets of cases are not isolated incidents. On the one hand, famed
foreign-relations law principles including the act of state doctrine,11 the
public law taboo,12 and Zschernig’s foreign affairs preemption13 rely on
the notion that U.S. courts should not sit in judgment on foreign states.
Judges in these cases, as well as scholars writing in the area,14 frequently
suggest that U.S. courts should sit out of important disputes due to
considerations of sovereign equality and international comity.15 Yet on the
other hand, in less attention-grabbing cases, U.S. courts routinely sit in
judgment on foreign judgments, laws, legal systems, and interests,
sometimes concluding that they do meet U.S. standards.16
The first goal of this project is to identify and catalog those
circumstances in which U.S. courts sit in judgment on foreign states. This
extensive catalog should cast doubt on unsystematic objections to sitting
in judgment: Were we to accept that sitting in judgment was per se

8. Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014).
9. See Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ First Am. Compl. Under FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6), Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md.
2014) (No. 8:11-cv-01538), 2013 WL 4521770.
10. Mezu v. Progress Bank of Nigeria, No. JKB-12-2865, 2013 WL 3146929 (D. Md. June 18,
2013) (drawing on, inter alia, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10–701 et seq.).
11. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (“Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory.”) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (“To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined
and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly ‘imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations.’”).
12. According to the “public law taboo,” the United States will not enforce foreign judgments or
recognize foreign causes of action that derive from foreign public law. See, e.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30
F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring), aff’d on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930);
William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002) [hereinafter
Dodge, Public Law Taboo]; Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the “Public Law Taboo” in
International Conflicts Law, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 (1999); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in
the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their
Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 321, 322–26 (1979).
13. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (finding an Oregon state statute preempted
because it “seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian
basis than our own.”).
14. See infra notes 18 & 157 (collecting sources).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
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impermissible, all sorts of current doctrines would need to be revisited.
Such a categorical rule is not only radical but also unjustified—the
doctrines in which courts sit in judgment are routine and unremarkable,
they protect important domestic and individual concerns, and they have
not sparked international incident. Nor is there a coherent distinction
between the doctrines that call for courts to sit in judgment and those that
do not.
Having identified these issues with existing law, this Article pivots to
the normative questions relating to sitting in judgment. In addition to the
occasional treatment of one issue or another,17 there has been recent
interest in sitting-in-judgment and related cases by scholars of
transnational litigation.18 But that literature, in my view, risks focusing too
much on the transnational aspects of these cases to the exclusion of
domestic institutional concerns. As a potential corrective, this Article
proposes a thought experiment: What if we crafted sitting-in-judgment
doctrine by reference to those structural factors that govern institutional
arrangements within the U.S. system? Comparative institutional analysis
would divide cases into those bilateral, legal, and constrained
adjudications for which the common-law courts were designed, versus
those polycentric, systemic, political inquiries best left to the political
branches. Considerations of institutional authority would buttress these
divisions as well. Federalism, with implications for both authority and
capacity, could suggest further divisions of institutional responsibility.
And individual rights would factor into the work of courts on these cases
(and others). Overall, this structural approach suggests that U.S. courts
may be sitting in judgment too much and too little: some of the systemic
evaluations could be handed over to the political branches, but legal rules
like the act of state doctrine and the public law taboo may be unnecessarily
timid in their approach to transnational litigation.

17. Scholars occasionally look at particular doctrines and comment about whether consideration
of foreign legal acts is appropriate. E.g., Dodge, Public Law Taboo, supra note 12 (discussing the
public law taboo); Montre D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2007) (discussing judgment recognition); Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge
of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT’L L. 247 (1982) (discussing
extraterritorial discovery). These inquiries tend to be doctrine-specific.
18. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010); William S. Dodge, International Comity in
American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (2015) [hereinafter Dodge, Comity]; Michael D. Ramsey,
Escaping “International Comity,” 83 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1998); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80
GEO. L.J. 53 (1991). For a further discussion of Dodge’s work in particular, see infra note 50.
Professor Rutledge gets the closest to the approach of this Article in a symposium piece that looks to
the principle of sovereign equality to argue that U.S. court approaches should vary depending on
whether the foreign state is acting as a party, a regulator, or an adjudicator. Peter B. Rutledge, Toward
a Functional Approach to Sovereign Equality, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 181 (2012).
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In this way, this Article is part of a larger project of antiexceptionalism in transnational litigation.19 Although certainly not alone,
in previous work I have argued that special treatment need not be accorded
to class actions involving foreign plaintiffs20 and that standard tools of
statutory interpretation are sufficient in themselves to resolve international
ambiguities in statutes.21 More generally, this project suggests that we
should be cautious about creating international-specific solutions
unnecessarily while, at the same time, refocusing on those circumstances
for which international issues (and in particular international law) call for
exceptional treatment.22
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II addresses current law: those
situations in which U.S. courts avoid sitting in judgment on foreign states,
and the myriad situations in which sitting in judgment is an integral part of
existing doctrine. Part II concludes by showing that existing justifications
do not explain current doctrine descriptively or normatively. Part III
hypothesizes a structural approach to sitting in judgment that accounts for
the separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights. Part IV then
demonstrates how these lessons would be applied to the doctrines
previously described. This thought experiment demonstrates that there is
no per se reason that U.S. institutions should avoid sitting in judgment on
foreign state acts, but also that current law may not be allocating
responsibility for sitting in judgment consistent with domestic institutional
considerations.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW
This Part begins with a brief description of those decisions that reject
U.S. courts sitting in judgment on foreign acts, most prominently the act of
state doctrine and the public law taboo. Notably, courts translate their
concern with sitting in judgment into two seemingly contradictory
approaches—treating all foreign acts as valid (acts of state) or refusing to
honor them at all (public laws). Section B then catalogs doctrines in which

19. It is also consistent with recent efforts to “normalize” foreign affairs law. See Ganesh
Sitaraman & Ingrid B. Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897
(2015). But unlike Sitaraman and Wuerth, this Article imagines normalizing doctrine along domestic
institutional lines.
20. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion,
90 IND. L. J. 1387 (2015) [hereinafter Clopton, Transnational Class Actions].
21. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality, Technology, and National Security, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 45 (2016); Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Clopton, Replacing].
22. See infra notes 232–235 (discussing the role of international law); infra Part V (discussing
this claim generally).
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courts routinely sit in judgment on foreign states, judgments, laws, legal
systems, and interests, including in situations that look strikingly like acts
of state and public laws. The implication of this descriptive account is that
sitting in judgment may be within the judicial ken, and that these decisions
have not engendered significant response from domestic or international
law.
A. Refusing to Sit in Judgment
Perhaps the most prominent invocation of the sitting-in-judgment
argument can be found in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.23
Sabbatino was one of the many decisions in the fallout from the Cuban
government’s expropriation of American-owned property. The key issue
in Sabbatino was the reach of the act of state doctrine,24 which provides
that decisions of a foreign sovereign within its own territory are
presumptively valid.25 Although justifications for the act of state doctrine
have varied over the years,26 Sabbatino instantiated this rule as a reflection
of the seeming impropriety of courts invalidating foreign sovereign acts.27
Or, in the words of the Fifth Circuit, the act of state doctrine “averts
potential diplomatic embarrassment from the courts of one sovereign
sitting in judgment over the public acts of another.”28
Importantly, in order to avoid sitting in judgment on foreign state acts,
the act of state doctrine operates as a choice of law rule rather than an
abstention doctrine. The Sabbatino Court did not throw out the case, but

23. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
24. Other prominent act of state doctrine decisions include W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682 (1976); and Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
25. For further discussion of the act of state doctrine, see, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the
Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism
and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992); Daniel C. K. Chow, Rethinking the Act
of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 397 (1987);
Malvina Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of
U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 68 (1985); Louis Henkin, Act of State Today:
Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 175 (1967); Harold Hongju Koh,
Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
26. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404–
05 (1990) (reviewing historical justifications, including international law, comity, and separation of
powers).
27. The Court declared that “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory.” 376 U.S. at 416 (quoting Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
28. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980).
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instead treated the Cuban expropriation as providing the valid legal rule.29
In the name of sovereign equality, therefore, the Court treated the Cuban
expropriation as valid and resolved the rest of the case against the
background of that valid act.30 More generally, courts have used the act of
state doctrine to avoid passing on the validity of foreign executive acts,
legislation, military conduct,31 and judicial decisions,32 and have extended
that doctrine beyond formal enactments to informal and unofficial conduct
as well.33
On the other side of the coin are those sitting-in-judgment decisions
that operate as abstention rules. Illustrative of this approach are the various
doctrines that coalesce in the public law taboo.34 Sparing the details, U.S.
courts refuse to enforce foreign public-law judgments, including penal
judgments,35 tax judgments,36 and other civil judgments of a public-law
nature.37 Similarly, although U.S. courts are open to causes of action under
foreign law, U.S. courts will not hear foreign public-law claims.38 Why do
courts reject public-law actions? The answer is not that courts fear that
foreign public law is likely to conflict with fundamental American notions
of justice—the public policy exception in conflict of laws would address
this concern.39 Rather, courts reject public laws and judgments in large

29. 376 U.S. at 438 (noting that “the act of state doctrine reflects the desirability of presuming
the relevant transaction valid”).
30. See generally Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
31. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST.
1987) (“The act of state doctrine applies to acts such as constitutional amendments, statutes, decrees
and proclamations, and in certain circumstances to physical acts, such as occupation of an estate by the
state’s armed forces in application of state policy.”).
32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 1965) (“A judgment of a court may be an act of state. Usually, it is not . . . .”); In re Philippine
Nat’l Bank, 397 F.3d 768, 772–73 (9th Cir. 2005) (treating judgment as an act of state); Liu v.
Republic of China, 892 F. 2d 1419, 1432–34 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 443, Reporters’ Note 10 (rejecting judgments as acts of state).
33. See, e.g., Galu v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 873 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying act of state
doctrine to a Swiss expulsion order).
34. See supra note 12 (collecting sources). As Professor Dodge explained, only recently has the
“public law taboo” label covered both laws and judgments. Dodge, Public Law Taboo, supra note 12.
Etymology aside, this Article applies the taboo label to laws and judgments.
35. E.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (“The Courts of no country execute
the penal laws of another . . . .”).
36. E.g., Her Majesty the Queen in Right of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir.
1979).
37. See, e.g., Dodge, Public Law Taboo, supra note 12 at 185–93.
38. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for
Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 109 (1998) (noting that “[a] U.S. court will apply
foreign tort or contract law to decide a case before it, but it will not apply foreign regulatory law like
antitrust law.”).
39. E.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918) (discussing the public-policy
exception in the United States and elsewhere).

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/4

2016]

JUDGING FOREIGN STATES

9

part because they want to avoid the public-policy analysis altogether.40
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, the public
law taboo “appears to reflect a reluctance of courts to subject foreign
public law to judicial scrutiny.”41 As noted above, the act of state doctrine
avoids sitting in judgment of foreign acts by treating them as valid. The
public law taboo, on the contrary, turns this reluctance to sit in judgment
into a rule of abstention. Same argument, different result.42
Although not expressly abstention decisions, courts also have invoked
the concern with sitting in judgment to limit the reach of U.S. laws. In
Zschernig v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that an Oregon statute was
preempted because it called upon state judges to sit in judgment on foreign
acts, even though there was no federal enactment, practice, or policy that
preempted it.43 The Court objected because “[t]he statute as construed
seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a
more authoritarian basis than our own.”44 Similar logic has appeared in
other U.S. decisions. The Supreme Court held that the habeas statute
provided no relief in a case “that would require federal courts to pass
judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s
ability to speak with one voice in this area,”45 and Judge Bork channeled
this objection against Alien Tort Statute46 litigation because it called for
courts to “sit in judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own
countries with respect to their own citizens.”47 Meanwhile, some lower
courts have (seemingly) converted act-of-state precedents into abstention

40. Professor Dodge elaborated on three justifications: “(1) the difficulty of applying foreign
law; (2) the fear of embarrassing foreign nations; and (3) the notion that the courts of one nation
should not help to advance the interests of another.” Dodge, Public Law Taboo, supra note 12 at 164.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 483, Reporters’ Note 2.
42. In Sabbatino, the Court acknowledged as much: “Although [the revenue] rule presumes
invalidity in the forum whereas the act of state principle presumes the contrary, the doctrines have a
common rationale . . . .” 376 U.S. 398, 437 (1964). In dissent, Justice White argued that the majority
“fails to explain why it may be more embarrassing to refuse recognition to an extraterritorial
confiscatory law directed at nationals of the confiscating state than it would be to refuse effect to a
territorial confiscatory law.” Id. at 450 n.11 (White, J., dissenting).
43. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
44. Id. at 440. For further discussion of Zschernig, see, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v.
Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 704 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither
Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259 (2001).
45. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008).
46. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is a jurisdictional statute, providing that federal district courts
“shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2014). See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
47. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court cited favorably to this Bork quotation in limiting the scope of ATS
causes of action in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
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outcomes, refusing to entertain suits because they risked finding that
foreign governments failed to comply with statutory or contractual
duties.48 These decisions—like the public law taboo but contrary to
traditional act of state cases—remove cases from judicial consideration in
order to avoid disrespecting a foreign sovereign by sitting in judgment of
its sovereign acts.
B. Sitting in Judgment
In a public law decision, Judge Learned Hand wrote that “[t]o pass
upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate
should be, beyond the powers of a court.”49 This Section challenges his
descriptive claim by identifying many situations in which U.S. courts sit in
judgment on foreign states. The most obvious examples are those in which
U.S. courts sit in judgment on foreign states or officials as parties. This
Section briefly addresses those cases before turning to the less obvious
(but more relevant) situations in which U.S. courts sit in judgment on
foreign judgments, foreign laws, foreign legal systems, and foreign
interests.50
In addition to its taxonomic goal, this Section’s catalog of doctrines in
which courts judge foreign states implicitly undermines the normative
contention that U.S. courts should not sit in judgment on foreign acts. The
examples described here are commonsensical, facially reasonable, and
have not prompted notable reprisals from foreign states or the political
branches. Instead, sitting in judgment on foreign acts is a routine and
necessary part of litigation with international connections.

48. E.g., Spectrum Stores v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 2011) (antitrust law);
World Wide Minerals Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 116 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2000) (contract).
See also John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine, 47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 507 (2016) (criticizing
this approach to the act of state doctrine).
49. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring).
50. This categorization stands in marked contrast to Professor Dodge’s matrix of international
comity, which divides cases depending on the foreign government actor to whom the doctrine applies.
See Dodge, Comity, supra note 18. So, for example, Dodge would call judgment recognition
“adjudicative comity” because it involves consideration of a foreign judicial decision. This Article,
however, subdivides judgment recognition into component parts, e.g., whether the U.S. court is
evaluating the foreign judgment itself, the foreign substantive law applied, or the foreign legal system.
This distinction from Dodge has important consequences for our respective normative conclusions. It
might make sense for Dodge to conclude that “deference to the Executive would seem utterly
inappropriate . . . [when applied to] the enforcement of foreign judgments” when foreign judgments
are understood as judicial acts only. Id. at 2083. But, as this Article suggests in the next Part, it should
not seem as “utterly inappropriate” to defer to the political branches when the judgment-recognition
decision turns on an assessment of the foreign legal system as a whole. Indeed, institutional authority
and competence determinations may turn on exactly this type of distinction. See infra Part III.A.
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1. Foreign States, Instrumentalities, and Officials
It almost goes without saying that U.S. courts sit in judgment on
foreign states, officials, and instrumentalities when they are defendants in
U.S. litigation. These judgments are categorically different from those
addressed in the balance of this Article in that foreign states are
necessarily parties to these cases, but it is worth pausing on these
judgments to note a few salient features. And, it turns out that the analysis
recommended in Parts III and IV is consistent with current foreign
sovereign immunity law.51
Historically, the United States applied an absolute theory of sovereign
immunity that protected foreign states from all lawsuits in U.S. courts.52
By the mid-twentieth century, at the urging of the U.S. State Department,
courts applied a restrictive theory of immunity that limited immunity to
sovereign or public acts.53 And in 1976, Congress cut out the Executive
Branch by adopting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).54 The
FSIA detailed the circumstances under which a foreign state, political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality would not be entitled to
immunity—that is, when a U.S. court would be permitted to sit in
judgment.55 As amended, these circumstances include: (1) commercial
activity with a U.S. nexus; (2) noncommercial torts in the United States;
(3) taking of property located in the United States, in violation of
international law; (4) waiver; (5) arbitration-related matters; (6) rights to
property in the United States that were acquired by succession or gift, or
rights to immoveable property situated in the United States; (7) certain
admiralty matters; (8) counterclaims; and, most recently (9) involvement

51. See infra Parts III and IV. In brief, much like the recommended analysis below, U.S. federal
courts sit in judgment on foreign states in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) cases only at the
direction of a duly enacted statute, and they only apply standards created by that statute. And in some
FSIA cases, executive branch action is also required. Finally, of course, it is the judiciary that resolves
the bilateral questions of law and fact in these cases.
52. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578
(1943).
53. See, e.g., Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). See also Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 app. 2 (1976).
54. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (1976).
55. Id. Because FSIA does not define “foreign states,” at least some courts have taken it upon
themselves to judge statehood for entities not recognized by the Executive Branch—one more way that
courts sit in judgment. E.g., Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005). And
multiple courts have held that the FSIA does not interfere with their inherent power to issue contempt
orders against foreign sovereigns. See, e.g., Autotech Techs. v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499
F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2007); F.G. Hemisphere Assoc. v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 637 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
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in certain acts of terrorism.56 It also permits the enforcement of certain
judgments against foreign states.57 The FSIA does not provide any
immunity forbidding or limiting discovery in aid of the execution of a
judgment against a foreign state.58 Nor does it apply to foreign officials,
and thus foreign official immunity is still governed by common law.59
Finally, FSIA says nothing about foreign states as plaintiffs60 or amici,61
so when foreign states elect to file suits or briefs in U.S. courts, they also
can be judged.62
2. Foreign Judgments
The foregoing section addressed foreign states as parties to litigation.
While these cases certainly represent U.S. courts “sitting in judgment” on
foreign states, the focus of this Article is elsewhere. In particular, this
Article is concerned with the (usually) judicially created doctrines that
result in courts passing judgments on foreign acts when foreign states are
not parties to litigation.
Perhaps the most conventional way that U.S. courts sit in judgment on
foreign acts is when they evaluate foreign judgments for purposes of
recognition and enforcement. In what might surprise many readers, U.S.
courts presumptively enforce foreign judgments, provided they meet
certain baseline requirements.63
Prior to recognition or enforcement, U.S. courts engage in procedural
and substantive evaluations of the foreign proceedings. Procedurally, U.S.

56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11. In addition, it seems that states could open state courts to litigation
against foreign sovereigns separate from FSIA if the state authorizes cases that would not satisfy
Article III. See Envtl. World Watch, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., No. C05-1799 TEH, 2005 WL
1867728 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2005) (remanding case against putative sovereign actor for lack of federal
standing).
57. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–11.
58. Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014). In response to this decision
and BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (honoring arbitration interpretation of
relevant treaty), the President of Argentina accused the Supreme Court of “extortion.” See Tom
Hamburger & Roberto A. Ferdman, Argentine Leader Rejects U.S. Supreme Court Rulings in Debt
Case, WASH. POST (June 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-supreme-courtrejects-argentinas-appeal-in-debt-case-about-paying-off-holdouts/2014/06/16/cdfcf58e-f56c-11e3a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html.
59. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
60. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408–09 (1964) (“[S]overeign
states are allowed to sue in the courts of the United States.”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S.
308, 320 (1978) (allowing a foreign nation to sue for treble damages under antitrust laws).
61. See, e.g., Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1098267.
62. For data regarding foreign state performance as amici, see Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign
Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 VA. L. REV. 289 (2016).
63. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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courts will not enforce judgments that result from an unfair system or an
unfair process—a conclusion they reach only after sitting in judgment.64
Famously, a federal district court in New York barred the worldwide
enforcement of a $19 billion Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron due to
fraud and corruption.65 Substantively, U.S. courts may decline to enforce a
foreign judgment if it violates some notion of public policy.66 From free
speech67 to arbitration priority68 to whistleblower protection,69 U.S. courts
have declined to enforce foreign judgments based on forum public policy
interests. Thus, although the public law taboo claims to insulate foreign
public acts from judicial scrutiny, U.S. courts routinely sit in judgment of
private law decisions that touch on public law values.70
Despite prohibitions on enforcing penal judgments, U.S. courts also sit
in judgment on foreign criminal judgments. For example, U.S. courts may
need to look at a foreign criminal judgment in order to determine whether
it should contribute to a sentencing enhancement for prior criminal activity
or recidivism.71 Some states prohibit felons from possessing firearms and
interpret these provisions to apply to individuals convicted of felonies
abroad.72 Many states have double jeopardy standards that credit foreign

64. Hilton requires that the foreign court had personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, the
defendant had adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard, and the process was not fraudulent,
biased, or unfair. Id. The Uniform Acts that followed Hilton reflect similar requirements. See UNIF.
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962); UNIF. MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
ACT (2005) [hereinafter UFCMJRA].
65. Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
66. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (AM. LAW INST. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 445 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
67. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997). See also Carodine, supra note 17
(collecting other First Amendment cases).
68. South Ionian Shipping Co. v. Hugo Neu & Sons Int’l Sales Corp., 545 F. Supp. 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
69. Aguerre v. Schering-Plough Corp., 924 A.2d 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
70. See also infra note 134 and accompanying text (challenging the public versus private law
distinction).
71. William S. Dodge, The Penal and Revenue Rules, State Law, and Federal Preemption, in
FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 54 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014)
[hereinafter Dodge, Rules] (collecting sources); Alex Glashausser, The Treatment of Foreign Country
Convictions as Predicates for Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE L.J. 134,
142 (1994). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual expressly provide that foreign convictions are
not calculated into criminal history scores, § 4A1.2(h), but the same section allows those convictions
to factor into the court’s discretion to depart from the guidelines range. Id. (cross-referencing § 4A1.3).
See, e.g., United States v. Struzik, 572 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing Polish conviction); United
States v. Makki, 47 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing German conviction).
72. The Attorney General of the State of Washington, for example, interpreted the state’s felondispossession statute to provide that “a conviction in a foreign country would disqualify an individual
from the right to possess a firearm in Washington State if the foreign conviction is equivalent to a
serious offense or other felony under Washington law.” Letter from Attorney Gen. Robert W.
Ferguson to Representative Jason Overstreet, (June 2, 2014), http://www.atg.wa.gov/agoopinions/whether-criminal-conviction-foreign-country-disqualifies-applicant-obtaining-concealed. Cf.
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prosecutions.73 And at least two bar associations will consider disciplining
lawyers based on convictions in foreign courts.74 To apply these rules,
U.S. courts must assess not only the content of the foreign criminal
judgment, but also its propriety: a U.S. court would not apply a recidivism
enhancement or a felon-in-possession statute if the prior conviction was
fundamentally unfair,75 nor would it dismiss a criminal case on the basis of
double jeopardy if the foreign prosecution was a sham.76 Thus, by
adopting rules that incorporate foreign criminal judgments, U.S. courts
also open the door to sitting in judgment of those foreign acts.
3. Foreign Laws and Acts
In addition to foreign laws that appear in foreign judgments, U.S.
courts sit in judgment on foreign laws directly. Because the line between a
foreign law and a foreign act is blurry, this Section treats them together.77
As will become apparent, this review belies the notion that foreign public
laws and acts of state are immune from judicial scrutiny.
First, mainstream conflict of laws analysis calls upon courts to sit in
judgment on foreign laws. In many circumstances, U.S. courts will
consider applying foreign law to a dispute with foreign connections. But
even when foreign law would normally apply, U.S. courts can reject the
foreign law if the rule or its results violate the public policy of the forum.78

Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (interpreting the federal felon-dispossession statute to
apply to domestic convictions only).
73. Dodge, Rules, supra note 71 (collecting sources). Federal law, however, does not. For an
interesting argument regarding double jeopardy and international law prosecutions, including historical
support for the view, see Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A
Jurisdictional Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769 (2009).
74. See In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Minn. 1978) (crediting Canadian conviction); In re
Wilde, 68 A.3d 749 (D.C. 2013) (holding that Hearing Committee could take into account a foreign
conviction if certain requirements were satisfied).
75. In State v. Herzog, 740 P.2d 380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), for example, a Washington state
court held that foreign convictions may be included in criminal history for sentencing purposes but
rejected the inclusion of defendant’s West German conviction as constitutionally invalid (because he
was convicted by a two-person jury).
76. Federal courts have considered whether to apply double jeopardy when defendants claim that
a foreign prosecution was a sham for a U.S. federal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 85
F.3d 823, 827 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Baptista–Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. McRary, 616 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Richardson, 580
F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978).
77. In Sabbatino, for example, the expropriation was the result of an executive resolution, but it
was issued pursuant to express legislative authorization from Public Law 851. And, the Supreme Court
has said that the act of state doctrine may apply to a “statute, decree, order, or resolution” of the
foreign government. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976).
More generally, it must be acknowledged that the line between foreign laws and foreign executive acts
is blurry, particularly in states that have less crisp divisions among the branches.
78. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
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In other words, courts sit in judgment of the relevant foreign law and
decide whether it can be appropriately applied in a particular case. To give
just one example, in Victor v. Sperry, California courts refused to apply a
Mexican no-fault rule for car-accident liability because it violated
California’s public policy of requiring negligence for liability to attach.79
As noted above, the public law taboo means that courts do not apply the
public policy exception to foreign public laws, but again, U.S. courts make
public policy judgments about foreign private laws in the normal course.80
American courts also apply and judge foreign law when foreign law is
an input in domestic substantive or procedural doctrines. And these cases
of “foreign law as datum”81 may include foreign public laws.82 To name
just a few examples of embedded foreign law: defendants in breach of
contract cases may plead supervening foreign illegality;83 domestic
statutes may create liability for conduct in violation of foreign law;84 the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination may apply to
potential foreign prosecutions;85 Fourth Amendment analysis of overseas
wiretapping may employ foreign law as a measure of reasonableness;86
courts manage civil discovery in light of foreign laws that affect potential
compliance;87 foreign law provides the basis to determine if foreign

79. 329 P.2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
80. For one timely example, consider that the law of marriage is subject to the public policy
exception. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2).
81. Conflict-of-laws scholars occasionally have used the term “foreign law as datum” to describe
cases in which U.S. courts incorporate foreign law into domestic doctrines. E.g., Hans W. Baade, The
Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 448 (1995); Herma Hill Kay, Conflict of
Laws: Foreign Law as Datum, 53 CAL. L. REV. 47 (1965). Some sources refer to these questions as
“incidental” uses of foreign law. See A. E. Gotlieb, The Incidental Question Revisited—Theory and
Practice in the Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 734 (1977) (taking issue with this label as
applied to foreign law as datum). Conflicts scholars identify such cases in order to disregard them as
“false conflicts.” The concept of “foreign law as datum” is useful in understanding these cases, but
merely identifying it is not the only goal here.
There is also an analogy to the notion of “embedded federal law” in state causes of action that
may be relevant for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
82. For a particularly useful catalog of public laws as datum, see Baade, supra note 81.
83. See UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(a) (AM. LAW INST.& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also Jody Daniel
Newman, Note, Exchange Controls and Foreign Loan Defaults: Force Majeure as an Alternative
Defense, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1499 (1986).
84. See Thomas O. Main, The Word Commons and Foreign Laws, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 219,
244, n.138 (2013) (collecting sources, inter alia, Registration and Regulation of Brokers and Dealers;
Tariff Act of 1930; Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972; The Lacey Act of 1990).
85. See Diane M. Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201 (1998).
86. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 853–854 (2004).
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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entities have the capacity to sue and be sued;88 U.S. service of process
abroad is permissible “as prescribed by the foreign country’s law”;89
particular foreign laws are relevant to venue decisions;90 laws creating
exceptions for double taxation require an assessment of whether foreign
tax liability attaches;91 resolution of various types of disputes requires
determination of the validity of a foreign marriage;92 and the foreign
sovereign compulsion doctrine provides that courts will not order
extraterritorial conduct that is illegal under the laws of the foreign state.93
Just this term, the Supreme Court denied cert in a case in which the Fifth
Circuit interpreted the Mexican Constitution and Mexican federal and state
law to find that three Mexican states (Veracruz, Tamaulipas, and Quintana
Roo) lacked sufficient property interests to sue BP for harms arising from
the Deepwater Horizon incident.94 One hundred seventy five years ago,
Justice Story was able to release the slaves in The Amistad by using
Spanish public law abolishing the slave trade to provide the definitions for
relevant treaty terms.95 Each of these categories incorporates foreign
law—including public law—but each one permits a U.S. court to sit in
judgment of the relevant foreign law in order to weed out those laws that
violate some fundamental notion of fairness or public policy.
What does it look like for a U.S. court to sit in judgment on foreign law
in these cases? Two helpful examples come from civil discovery and
venue. With respect to discovery, the Supreme Court held that a court may

88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2)(A).
90. See infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text (discussing forum non conveniens, forum
selection agreements, lis pendens, and antisuit injunctions).
91. See Baade, supra note 81, at 451.
92. Eugene Volokh highlights “sitting in judgment” on foreign marriages with respect to
polygamy, citing cases in which U.S. courts honor a foreign polygamous marriage in a probate dispute
but not in immigration and statutory rape cases. See Eugene Volokh, Polygamous Foreign Marriages
under U.S. Law, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/05/polygamous-foreign-marriages-under-u-s-law/ (citing In
re Bir’s Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256 (1948) (inheritance); Al Sharabi v. Heinauer, No. C-10-2695 SC,
2011 WL 3955027 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) (immigration); and People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116
(1992) (statutory rape)).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 (AM. LAW INST. 1987 ). Title
VII and the ADEA, among others, have codified this exception. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b) (2014); 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2014). Some statutes also make foreign legality an affirmative defense. See, e.g.,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c) & 78dd-2(c) (2014).
94. In re Deepwater Horizon, 784 F.3d 1019 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct 536 (2015).
95. The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 520 (1841) (“[T]he laws of Spain would seem to furnish the
proper rule of interpretation. . . . By the laws, treaties and edicts of Spain, the African slave-trade is
utterly abolished; the dealing in that trade is deemed a heinous crime; and the negroes thereby
introduced into the dominions of Spain, are declared to be free.”). The Court also used this logic to
reject as evidence of ownership the “public documents of the [Spanish] government” that accompanied
The Amistad. Id.
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require parties to comply with discovery orders even if compliance places
them in violation of foreign law.96 However, the foreign illegality may be
relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion to manage discovery and
punish noncompliance.97 Thus, U.S. courts are authorized to treat the
foreign law with more or less respect based on their judgment of it. In
particular, U.S. courts often honor substantive policy choices (e.g., privacy
laws) that limit discoverability, but courts give less deference to foreign
“blocking statutes” seemingly adopted in order to obstruct U.S. discovery
requests.98 To apply this distinction, U.S. courts must sit in judgment on
foreign laws and determine in which category they fit.
Blocking statutes of a different sort are relevant in venue cases. The
doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a U.S. court to dismiss a case for
which it has jurisdiction only if an alternative foreign forum is more
convenient.99 If there is no alternative forum, the case must stay in the
U.S. court.100 Ostensibly to help citizen plaintiffs recover damages in U.S.
courts, Ecuador passed a law stripping its courts of jurisdiction over cases
first filed abroad—meaning that a U.S. defendant’s motions to dismiss for
forum non conveniens may be denied because Ecuador would not be an
“adequate alternative forum.”101 In practice, U.S. courts have been
“skeptical” of foreign jurisdictional blocking statutes.102 Again, disparate
treatment of blocking statutes requires courts to sit in judgment on foreign
laws, crediting some but not others.
Finally, before moving on, it turns out that the act of state doctrine

96. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 94 (1934); Société Internationale Pour
Participations v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 442 (1987).
97. Id.
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442, Reporters’ Note 5 (AM.
LAW INST. 1987) (“[W]hen a state has jurisdiction to prescribe and its courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate, adjudication should take place on the basis of the best information available, and that
statutes that frustrate this goal need not be given the same deference by courts of the United States as
differences in substantive rules of law.”). Prominent examples include Canadian and European
industry-specific blocking statutes passed after U.S. antitrust investigations began in those areas. See
Donald I. Baker, Antitrust Conflicts between Friends: Canada and the United States in the Mid1970’s, 11 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 165 (1978); Paul A. Batista, Confronting Foreign “Blocking”
Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from Non-Resident Parties to American Litigation, 17
INT’L LAW. 61 (1983); P.C.F. Pettit & C.J.D. Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 BUS. LAW. 697 (1982).
99. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
100. Id.; GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION (5th ed.
2011) at 426–53.
101. See Ecuadorian Ley 55 (1998) (“Should the lawsuit be filed outside Ecuadorian territory, this
will definitely terminate national competency as well as any jurisdiction of Ecuadorian judges over the
matter.”). See also Leon v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001).
102. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 100, at 448 (collecting cases and calling U.S. courts
“skeptical”).
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highlights important examples of U.S. courts sitting in judgment. Recall
that in order to qualify as an act of state, the relevant foreign act must be a
sovereign act within the territory of the foreign state.103 These
qualifications suggest classes of cases that the act of state doctrine will not
protect. First, non-sovereign acts of state are subject to U.S. judicial
scrutiny. To apply this requirement, U.S. courts also must sit in judgment
on whether the conduct of a high government official is sovereign
enough.104 Second, extraterritorial acts of state are excluded.105 This
territorial requirement is particularly relevant (and particularly vexing106)
in cases involving intangible assets.107 Thus, U.S. courts may sit in
judgment on non-sovereign acts and nonterritorial sovereign ones.108
American courts also may “sit in judgment” of acts of state that meet
all of that doctrine’s requirements. In Environmental Tectonics, the
Supreme Court explained that the act of state doctrine stops U.S. courts
from judging the validity of foreign acts, but it permits courts to inquire
into the motives for those acts.109 In that case, the Supreme Court allowed
litigation to proceed even though the lower court would determine whether
the Nigerian government awarded a government contract as a result of a
bribe.110 Even in act of state cases, therefore, U.S. courts may judge (and,
if necessary, impugn) foreign sovereign acts.111
In sum, U.S. courts sit in judgment on foreign laws with respect to
public policy values; they judge foreign private and public laws when they
serve as inputs in domestic doctrinal analyses; and they assess and impugn

103. See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416.
104. E.g., Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 392 (3d Cir. 2006) (letters from
governmental entities not “acts of state”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980)
(suggesting that torture by government officials likely was not an “act of state”); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293–94 (3d Cir. 1979) (issuing a patent is not an “act of
state”).
105. E.g., Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed’n, 528 F.3d 934, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Soviet
act of state not protected when it occurred in Poland); F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Consulting Eng’rs
Firm v. Harza Eng’g Co., 882 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that act of state applies to an
expropriation only if it is “complete within the foreign state”).
106. For example, in the words of one court of appeals, “the concept of the situs of a debt for act
of state purposes differs from the ordinary concept.” Allied Bank Int’l. v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1985).
107. See, e.g., id. at 522; Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706,
715 (5th Cir. 1968).
108. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (describing the scope of the doctrine and
collecting cases).
109. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
110. See id. See also Envtl Tectonics Corp., v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1393
(D.N.J. 1987) (worrying that such a judgment could “impugn or question the nobility of a foreign
nation’s motivations”).
111. At least one court has described a “corruption exception” to the act of state doctrine. See
United States v. Labs of Va., Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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putative acts of state.
4. Foreign Legal Systems
In addition to sitting in judgment on foreign legal acts, U.S. courts also
make broader judgments about foreign legal systems. And, although it is
difficult to measure, it certainly would not be out of line to suggest that
such system-wide judgments may strike more deeply at national dignity
than rulings about particular judgments or laws.
First, as mentioned above, U.S. courts will not dismiss cases under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens unless there is an adequate alternative
forum in a foreign state.112 Applying this standard, U.S. courts sit in
judgment on foreign legal systems generally.113 Courts offer similar
system-wide evaluations when considering forum selection clauses,114
stays (lis pendens),115 and antisuit injunctions.116 American courts have
denied forum non conveniens motions, for example, because they found
the relevant foreign system to be too corrupt, too slow, or insufficiently
independent.117 In responding to a forum non conveniens motion naming
the courts of Iran, one district court judge wrote: “I have no confidence

112. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
113. According to one empirical study, between 1982 and 2006, courts denied forum non
conveniens motions based on the lack of an adequate alternative forum 18% of the time. Michael T.
Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 526 (2009). Note, though, that a forum might be
inadequate for reasons beyond systemic concerns, such as an expired statute of limitations.
114. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 346 (8th Cir.
1985); Petersen v. Boeing Co., 108 F. Supp. 3d 726, 731 (D. Ariz. 2015) (holding that Saudi Arabian
courts were not “adequate”).
115. See, e.g., Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994); Ingersoll
Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987).
116. See, e.g., Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 16 (1st
Cir. 2004); Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
117. E.g., Henderson v. Metro. Bank & Trust Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding
Philippine judicial system inadequate due to excessive filing fee); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978
F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding Bolivian judicial system to be “too corrupt”); Sablic v.
Armada Shipping Aps., 973 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (finding that Croatia was not adequate
due to instability and delay); Sangeorzan v. Yangming Marine Transp. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 650, 653–
54 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (finding that Taiwan was not an adequate forum where defendant was forty-eight
percent owned by Taiwanese government); Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228
(3d Cir. 1995) (finding Indian courts subject parties to “intolerable” delay); Canadian Overseas Ores,
Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(expressing concerns with independence of Chilean judiciary); .
Interestingly, two of the aforementioned decisions finding foreign systems to be inadequate were
decided by the same judge in the same year. See Sablic, 973 F. Supp. 745; Sangeorzan, 951 F. Supp.
650. I do not intend to suggest any connection, but it must also be noted that the same judge was
impeached in 2009. See H.R. Res. 520, 11th Cong. (2009).
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whatsoever in the plaintiffs’ ability to obtain justice at the hands of the
courts administered by Iranian mullahs. On the contrary, I consider that if
the plaintiffs returned to Iran to prosecute this claim, they would probably
be shot.”118 Even in less extreme cases, and even when the courts
ultimately conclude that a foreign system is adequate, U.S. courts must sit
in judgment and give voice to criticisms of the foreign system.119
On the back end, U.S. courts sit in judgment on foreign legal systems
when deciding whether to recognize and enforce foreign judgments.120 In
addition to the individualized scrutiny described above,121 U.S. courts will
not enforce judgments if the foreign legal system as a whole is
problematic. The Supreme Court required, among other things, “a system
of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice,”
and the Uniform Acts reject judgments rendered “under a judicial system
that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.”122 Although uncommon, U.S. courts
have refused recognition of foreign judgments based on these system-wide
evaluations.123 To give just a few examples, U.S. courts have held that Iran
does not provide “civilized jurisprudence”;124 “Nicaragua lacks impartial
tribunals”;125 “the Liberian judicial system was not fair and impartial and
did not comport with the requirements of due process”;126 and that
Moroccan “judges feel tremendous pressure to render judgments that
comply with the wishes of the royal family.”127 In one oft-cited opinion,

118. Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 767 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2005)
(denying forum non conveniens motion because suit in Indonesia may put plaintiffs at risk); Cabiri v.
Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same, Ghana).
119. E.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing, inter alia, the competence of Indian lawyers and the delays
of their courts).
120. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
121. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.
122. UFCMJRA, § 4(b)(1), 13 U.L.A pt. 2 (1963).
123. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 100, at 1146–55 (collecting cases).
124. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1995).
125. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
126. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
127. DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl. S.A., 38 F. Supp. 3d 805, 814 (W.D. Tex. 2014). See
also In re Perry H. Koplik & Sons, Inc., 357 B.R. 231, 244 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Where, as
unfortunately is the case here, the judicial system [of Indonesia] has been shown to have systemic
corruption, the Court cannot grant that judicial system’s determinations comity under either state or
federal law.”). Of course, federal and state courts also have approved of many foreign court systems.
See, e.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000) (approving English court
system); Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 943 A.2d 573 (Me. 2008) (approving German
courts); de la Mata v. American Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Del. 1991) (approving Bolivian
courts, but rejecting judgment on case-specific grounds); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833
F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) (approving Belgian courts); Chou v. Shieh, No. G031589, 2004 WL 843708
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Judge Posner approved an English judgment, noting that this was a much
easier case than “if the challenged judgment had been rendered by Cuba,
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Congo, or some other nation whose adherence to
the rule of law and commitment to the norm of due process are open to
serious question.”128 And, again, even if the courts ultimately enforce the
judgment, these doctrines require courts to entertain such system-wide
criticisms on a more regular basis.129
Finally, in some substantive areas of law, U.S. court judgments about
foreign legal systems are data in domestic doctrines. For example,
immigration and extradition law demand sweeping judgments about
foreign systems prior to certain judicial actions.130
In sum, despite protestations against sitting in judgment of an act of
state or public law, U.S. courts are willing to sit in judgment of an entire
foreign legal system and, at times, deem it biased, corrupt, or uncivilized.
5. Foreign Interests
Lastly, a number of doctrines require that U.S. courts sit in judgment
on foreign sovereign interests, attempting both to identify those interests
and weigh their intensity against countervailing considerations.
“Interests analysis” approaches to conflict of laws, as their name
suggests, require an assessment of a foreign state’s interest in a particular
case.131 Having identified competing interests, U.S. courts must balance
those interests, and in so doing, sit in judgment on the merit and intensity
of the foreign state policy. Moreover, in some circumstances, U.S. courts
applying conflict of laws principles ask whether a particular outcome
violates foreign public policy.132

(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004) (approving Taiwanese courts); S.B. v. W.A., 959 N.Y.S.2d 802 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2012) (approving Abu Dhabi courts with respect to divorce decree and order of custody). This
practice is not a recent creation—the Supreme Court of Florida, for example, approved the Cuban
court system in this context nearly one hundred years ago. Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764 (Fla. 1917).
128. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.
129. For example, in a decision recognizing a Romanian judgment, the Southern District of New
York noted that “the record does demonstrate that the Romanian judicial system is far from perfect. As
[defendant] points out, ‘corruption remains a concern’ in Romania and there ‘is some evidence that
[due process] guarantees are not always accorded.’” S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters. Ltd., 36 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court also quoted the Carnegie Endowment regarding
concerns about “serious shortcomings” in Romanian courts including “illegal behavior, particularly
corruption by government officials; a common attitude at the higher levels of the power structure that
the government and the state are above the law; and only weak institutional reform processes
concerning both the law-making and law-enforcing processes.” Id. at n.7.
130. See, e.g., Baade, supra note 81 (collecting sources).
131. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1963).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST.1971).
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U.S. courts sit in judgment on foreign interests in other circumstances
as well. American courts have invoked a foreign state’s interest (or lack
thereof) in assessing the reach of U.S. law,133 or when deciding whether a
foreign state’s interest in state-court litigation is sufficient to trigger
federal-court jurisdiction.134 Finally, in resolving the discovery issues
described above, courts consider the foreign state’s interest in the law that
may be violated.135 Indeed, when the Supreme Court considered the effect
of the Hague Evidence Convention on U.S. law, it explicitly rejected the
concern of the court of appeals that U.S. courts should not sit in judgment
on foreign state compliance with a treaty obligation.136
In all of these cases, U.S. courts scrutinize foreign interests and are
willing to trump them when appropriate.
C. Review
Section A reviewed situations in which U.S. courts abstain from sitting
in judgment on foreign states. These decisions imply that sitting in
judgment disrespects foreign sovereigns or harms U.S. foreign relations
interests. Yet Section B highlighted myriad situations in which U.S. courts
sit in judgment on foreign states, laws, systems, judgments, and interests,
including putative acts of state and public laws. The range of targets and
issues is broad:
Target of Judgment
Foreign states

Foreign judgments

Doctrinal Category
-FSIA exceptions for states
-Common law exceptions for officials
-Recognition & enforcement of civil judgments
-Criminal sentencing
-Double jeopardy

133. In cases like Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court limited the reach of
U.S. law to avoid “unintended clashes” with foreign laws that could cause “international discord.” 133
S.C.t 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
Foreign governments filed amicus briefs on both sides of the Kiobel case. See, e.g., Brief for the
Government of the Argentine Republic as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491); Brief of the Governments of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae
in Support of the Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct 1659 (2013) (No. 101491), 2012 WL 405480.
134. E.g., Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
135. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat’l. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussing
German interest in financial regulation).
136. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522 (1987).
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Target of Judgment

Doctrinal Category

Foreign laws and acts

-Conflict of laws
-Supervening foreign illegality
-Statutory incorporation
-Fifth Amendment
-Fourth Amendment
-Civil discovery
-Service of process
-Venue
-Double taxation
-Foreign sovereign compulsion
-Nonsovereign acts of state
-Nonterritorial acts of state
-Act of state motivations

Foreign legal systems

-Forum non conveniens
-Forum selection clauses
-Lis pendens
-Antisuit injunctions
-Recognition & enforcement of civil judgments
-Immigration
-Extradition

Foreign interests

23

-Conflict of laws “interests analysis”
-Extraterritoriality of U.S. law
-Federal common law of foreign relations
-Civil discovery

Before considering the affirmative case for revising these doctrines, it
is important to consider them on their own terms. The division between
the doctrines in Section A and Section B would make sense if acts of state
and public laws were special in ways that made sitting in judgment of
them too intrusive with respect to international comity.137
A clear-eyed review of the doctrinal landscape belies this comity
explanation. First, as shown above, foreign acts of state and public laws
are not immune from scrutiny. Courts may criticize the motives for acts of
state, sit in judgment of acts of state that fall outside the doctrine’s narrow

137. See infra note 157 (collecting sources on comity). Alternatively, Professor Baade suggests
that foreign public law is incorporated domestically in inverse proportion to its connection to the lex
causae—e.g., courts will not allow foreign public law to serve as the basis of a claim, but they will
acknowledge public law as datum. Baade, supra note 81. This approach does not, however, explain
why public law should be treated differently from private law, nor does it explain whether abstention
or wholesale incorporation is preferred or account for relevant institutional and individual interests.
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limits, and evaluate public laws as datum. Nor is there any principled
distinction between private and public law: law of either type may strike at
important national values or private interests; the distinction between the
two is notoriously blurry; and courts are not especially well-suited to draw
such a line if called upon to do so.138 In addition, if sitting in judgment on
foreign acts of state or foreign public laws were truly exceptional, it is odd
that courts have operationalized this assessment in contrary ways—
validating all foreign acts of state as opposed to excluding all public
laws.139 Indeed, it is odd that the judiciary, not well known for its mastery
of foreign relations, is the branch most frequently taking up this charge at
all.140 Finally, as made clear in Section B, U.S. courts sit in judgment on
foreign legal systems and foreign interests in ways that seem to be more
disrespectful than the insulated act of state and public law cases would
be.141
At a minimum, therefore, this Article sits in a long line of works
suggesting that doctrinal reasons do not always line up with doctrinal
outputs.142 But this Article attempts more. The remaining Parts explore
how these questions might look if refracted through a different set of
prisms.

138. For related arguments, see, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the
Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975 (1994). In his defense of
the public law taboo, McConnaughay seems to suggest an externality-based distinction between public
and private law. See McConnaughay, supra note 12. But McConnaughay does not explain why we
should ask courts to determine which externalities are sufficient to trump individual interests. See infra
Part III.B.
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. Note that the decisions to cleave off acts of state and public laws, to define the contours of
those categories, and to deem one valid and the other verboten, were laid down by courts. Even if
comity were the right measure, why would we expect adjudication to translate comity into legal
doctrine in these areas? These institutional arguments are further developed below.
141. A related argument derives from the notion of “false conflicts” in conflict-of-laws analysis.
See CURRIE, supra note 129. Professor Currie’s approach to conflicts begins with a division between
true and false conflicts. False conflicts come in two stripes: situations in which the two states regulate
the same conduct in the same way, and situations in which only one state has an interest in regulation.
(True conflicts involve two interested states with inconsistent regulations.) For one-interested-state
false conflicts, there is no conflict that the forum needs to untangle. Some conflicts scholars discussing
foreign law as datum suggest that those cases present false conflicts of this type—the forum has no
interest in regulating, for example, the procedural rules governing foreign litigation. See supra note 81.
Currie’s definition of “interest” is misleading because, to the extent U.S. doctrines depend on foreign
inputs, they have an “interest” in the result (whether or not it meets Currie’s particular definition of
“interest”). Perhaps more to the point here, individual and institutional interests turn on these
resolutions, and those interests should drive doctrine in this area. See infra Part III.
142. For an example germane to this Article, see Professor Harold Koh’s criticism of transnational
cases in which judges fell into “doctrinal mismatches, [e.g.,] dismissing a case on judicial competence
grounds that actually reflects comity and separation-of-powers concerns.” Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2394 (1991).
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III. STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO FOREIGN ACTS
Although the aforementioned doctrines may not achieve ideal
coherence, our first impulse may be that additional attention is not
justified. Perhaps it is best not to rock the boat.143
A number of reasons cut against this laissez faire approach. For one
thing, certainly these doctrines are not inconsequential from the
perspective of litigants.144 Transnational cases are common in U.S.
courts,145 and it is conceivable that sovereign-debt litigation146 in
particular may provide more opportunities for U.S. courts to weigh in on
these questions in the coming years. The role of courts in these doctrines is
another reason to press ahead: many of the rules described in Part II are
judge-made,147 and that means that change could come from any of the
fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal court system.
Relatedly, work to draft the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
is ongoing,148 and this project has particular significance for the
development of the law in these areas. Notably, more than one thousand
federal court decisions have cited the Restatements of Foreign Relations
Law to date,149 and there is no reason to think that this trend will abate
with the fourth installment. Finally, one cannot discuss foreign law in U.S.
courts without acknowledging the symbolic status that foreign law has
taken among some on the political right.150 This increased salience could
mean more rapid change, again suggesting that considered attention is
warranted at this time.
Having acknowledged that there are reasons to reconsider these
doctrines, a second observation is that blanket solutions—rejecting or

143. Cf. HUES CORPORATION, ROCK THE BOAT (RCA Records 1974).
144. To give but one example, it is understood that most cases dismissed on forum non
conveniens motions are never refiled. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The
Search for a Convenient Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (2012) (“A
successful forum non conveniens motion means that the case will not be heard in the United States and
may not be heard elsewhere.”).
145. But see Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 481 (2011) (suggesting a modest decline in transnational litigation).
146. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 67 (2014).
147. See supra Part II.
148. See Restatement of the Law Fourth, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, AM.
LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/foreign-relations-law-united-states.
149. For example, searching for “restatement” within four words of “foreign relations law” in
Westlaw’s federal courts database returns over 1,300 cases.
150. See, e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (enjoining proposed amendment to
Oklahoma constitution). See also Aaron Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International
and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 107 (2012); Mark Rahdert, Exceptionalism Unbound:
Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming).
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accepting all foreign inputs without sitting in judgment—are untenable.
One subtext of the catalog of U.S. courts sitting in judgment is that there
are various settings in which it makes sense to incorporate foreign law. A
pure “taboo” approach151 rejecting all foreign inputs simply ignores the
descriptive reality facing courts in transnational cases.152 The failure to
incorporate some foreign acts also could disrupt institutional
relationships153 and upset individual expectations.154 At the same time, the
individual interests in predictability and fairness that call for incorporation
of foreign acts also demand checks against unpredictability and unfairness
in this context. Courts thus sit in judgment to protect parties from arbitrary
or unpredictable outcomes. Avoiding extreme outcomes also tracks
institutional interests: the power to sit in judgment allows courts in
extreme situations to refuse to stamp certain foreign acts with the
imprimatur of the United States.155 And again, to the extent legislatures
direct courts when or how to sit in judgment, those directives should be
followed.156
So if now is the time to reconsider sitting in judgment, and if blanket

151. Note that such an approach could derive from pro- or anti-comity sources. The public law
taboo seemingly derives from respect for foreign states, though a similar outcome could arise from
xenophobic disrespect—e.g., the proposed state laws banning foreign law in domestic courts. See id.
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. For reasons of institutional authority and capacity, courts should follow legislative directions
to incorporate foreign law. For example, if a state passes a law that prohibits double jeopardy in any
form, courts, as faithful agents, must assess and incorporate foreign prosecutions as part of that
determination. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Similarly, whether forum non conveniens
arises from statute or common law (with legislative acquiescence), faithful agents must identify
adequate foreign forums before granting these motions. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying
text.
154. Individual interests in predictability and accuracy also support this approach. Expectationinforming law is not always domestic, so to the extent that courts aspire to honor settled expectations,
they may need to rely on foreign acts.
Further, to the extent that foreign acts produce “objective data”—for example, whether a foreign
court is open to a particular plaintiff—an accurate judicial system would need to take them into
account. Were courts to ignore these facts, they would risk inflicting injustice on litigants who happen
to be the subject of multiple states’ laws. Incarcerating a defendant twice for the same crime or
ordering a party to violate a foreign law may violate fundamental due process notions, and courts must
rely on foreign acts to assess the risks of these violations. Similarly, it would be unfair to individual
parties to send them to biased judicial systems in forum non conveniens or to enforce judgments from
biased systems.
155. Famously, in Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court refused to endorse a racial covenant on
real property—the Court did not rule that the covenant itself was unconstitutional, but instead declined
to allow the machinery of the state to enforce it. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
156. Legislatively, forum non conveniens statutes may limit dismissals to adequate foreign
forums, and judgment recognition statutes create exceptions to the presumption of enforceability.
International treaties also could require courts to sit in judgment. For example tax treaties and
extradition treaties may contain limitations that require courts to sit in judgment of the foreign legal
regime. See, e.g., Dodge, Public Law Taboo, supra note 12, at 193 (identifying tax treaties as an
exception to the revenue rule).

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/4

2016]

JUDGING FOREIGN STATES

27

approaches in either direction are not the answer, then what next? I am not
the first to identify a need for better law in this area. In recent years there
has been a boomlet in transnational litigation scholarship attending to
comity issues in one guise or another.157 These papers focus on the
interests of foreign states, sovereign equality, U.S. judicial attitudes to
foreign sources, and the international community of courts, among
others.158 Notice that all of these approaches are outward looking—they
prioritize the “foreign” state or the “foreign” policy. Similarly, one would
expect that the aforementioned work of the Restatement drafters would
also inflect these issues with a foreign-focused approach.159
But in the vein of anti-exceptionalism,160 this Article asks what sittingin-judgment doctrine would look like from an internal institutional
perspective on sitting in judgment. This approach reflects the concern that
scholars of transnational law risk being distracted by the “foreignness” of
these cases to the exclusion of basic questions about the separation of
powers, federalism, and individual rights.161 This triad, not some notion of
international comity, could put these doctrines in a new (old) frame.
The balance of this Part explores what this comparative institutional
analysis would tell us about how to treat sitting-in-judgment cases. This
thought experiment can help to identify what might be missing from
current proposals, and to consider whether these institutional
considerations might answer some outstanding questions about sitting-injudgment law. Part IV continues the experiment, applying this model to
the particular doctrines described above. These Parts do not establish, once

157. See, e.g., Dodge, Comity, supra note 18; Rutledge, supra note 18; Paul B. Stephan, Courts on
Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in International Judicial Encounters, 100 VA.
L. REV. 17 (2014); Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010); Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, __ STAN.
L. REV. __ (forthcoming); Pamela Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. __(forthcoming). This boomlet is perhaps part of a larger boom in transnational
litigation scholarship more generally, including among many others, Whytock, supra note 143; Donald
Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation,
100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012); Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1019 (2011); Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (2011).
158. See id.
159. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. See also Clopton, Replacing, supra note 21
(advocating for use of standard modes of statutory interpretation in cases previously subject to
presumption against extraterritoriality).
161. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 284 (1998) (referring to “the three central but troubled
institutions of American constitutionalism: federalism, separation of powers, and judicial protection of
individual rights”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203, 1216 (2011) (referring to “the three main axes of the Constitution: individual rights, federalism,
and separation of powers”).
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and for all, the normatively correct answers to all sitting-in-judgment
cases. But, at a minimum, they should shift the burden such that we should
demand good reasons to adopt “foreign”-specific approaches to issues
otherwise provided for by domestic institutional considerations.
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A. Separation of Powers: Institutional Authority
Acknowledging the need for a sitting-in-judgment check does not tell
us whether the judiciary is the right judge. Part II reviewed situations in
which courts sit in judgment or decline to do so, but the judiciary is not the
only relevant institution. Congress frequently sits in judgment on foreign
states when making decisions about foreign and military assistance,
international trade agreements, and sanctions.162 The Executive Branch
also sits in judgment. In addition to decisions about recognition and
diplomacy,163 the Executive Branch has been tasked with making certain
country-specific assessments such as identifying state sponsors of
terrorism164 and approving foreign government acquisitions of U.S.
assets.165 Decisions to negotiate international agreements with particular
foreign states are also the province of the Executive Branch.166 This
Section considers the authority aspect of comparative institutional design,
before turning to the capacity component in the next Section.
Even if one disputes the proper constitutional allocation of foreignaffairs powers,167 it is indisputable that the political branches make laws
that cabin the authority of federal courts or direct their operation. To that
end, were the political branches to make choices about the treatment of
foreign acts, it follows that courts should treat those decisions as binding
(absent a constitutional objection). Political branch involvement could take
multiple forms. First, the political branches could declare certain foreign
acts to be taboo in U.S. courts—for example, the federal government has
instructed courts to reject foreign defamation judgments unless they
comply with the First Amendment;168 and state statutes that purport to
reject foreign law may bar the incorporation of foreign acts.169 Second, the
political branches could direct courts to treat certain foreign acts as
presumptively valid—the United States attempted to negotiate a
judgments treaty with the United Kingdom;170 and one could imagine the

162. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 8501–8551 (2012) (Iran sanctions).
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
164. Export Administration Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C § 2405(j) (2014); Arms Export Control Act, § 40,
22 U.S.C § 2780 (2014); Foreign Assistance Act § 620A, 22 U.S.C § 2371 (2014).
165. Defense Production Act of 1950 (as amended) § 721, 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565 (effective
December 1, 2015).
166. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
167. Consider, for example, the various opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
168. 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105 (2014).
169. See supra note 150 (discussing proposed Oklahoma constitutional amendment).
170. See, e.g., Peter Hay & Robert J. Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments
Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421 (1976).
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act of state doctrine codified in a statute171 or a treaty.172 Third, the
political branches could reallocate institutional responsibilities—forum
non conveniens statutes, for example, often require courts to make
systemic judgments about foreign legal systems;173 and administrative
exhaustion could be required for certain foreign-act claims.174 Fourth, the
political branches could lay out standards for sitting in judgment—a
judgment-recognition statute could specify the criteria for
enforceability,175 including a reciprocity requirement.176 At each level of
analysis, therefore, the political branches can (and often should) move
first.
It is not an accident that the foregoing examples include administrative
actions, treaties, and legislation. None of these forms has a monopoly on
political branch authority. Indeed, potential exceptions to the act of state
doctrine reflect each of these modalities of political-branch participation.
The Bernstein exception provides that the act of state doctrine does not
attach when the Executive Branch expressly states that it need not
apply.177 The treaty exception says that, when applying a standard derived
from an international treaty, the act of state doctrine does not bar a court
from sitting in judgment.178 And the Second Hickenlooper Amendment is
a federal statute that rejects the act of state doctrine in certain cases.179
This discussion of institutional authority suggests that we can learn
quite a bit about sitting in judgment without reference to international
comity or foreign-affairs exceptionalism. Executive officials participating

171. It seems, for example, that the federal government created an act of state rule for bank
deposits in the Federal Reserve Act. 12 U.S.C. § 633 (2014).
172. Indeed, Sabbatino’s canonical statement of the act of state doctrine expressly reserved cases
in which there existed “a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles
. . . .” 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
173. To pick one example, a Virginia statute limits forum non conveniens dismissals to situations
in which there exists a “fair” alternative forum. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-265 (2007).
174. This administrative-exhaustion approach is common in federal government litigation. See,
e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (insert date of cited edition). The Supreme Court
has indicated that it might be amenable to an exhaustion requirement in ATS cases. Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 n.21 (2004).
175. See, e.g., UFCMJRA § 4.
176. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114(10) (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 23A
(2015).
177. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d
Cir. 1949) and 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). But see First Nat’l. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759 (1972) (at least five justices declining to adopt Bernstein exception).
178. See, e.g., Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Ethiopia,
729 F.2d 422, 425 (6th Cir. 1984). See also supra note 172 (quoting Sabbatino regarding treaties).
179. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2014) (no act of state protection for acts “in violation of the
principles of international law” as applied to “claim[s] of title or other right to property” within the
United States).
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in public-law litigation and courts respecting treaties and statutes are not
transnational-specific ideas. Instead, these conceptions rely on political
judgments by political branches, pursuant to their formal constitutional
authority.
B. Separation of Powers: Institutional Capacity
Alongside questions of authority are questions of capacity. If we
presume that the Constitution allows the political branches to allocate
decisional authority, then it is capacity that should guide the exercise of
that authority. In particular, the comparative mechanics of judicial and
political resolution suggest a potential division of labor among the
branches in sitting-in-judgment cases.
Turning first to the judicial process, U.S. courts are equipped to handle
disputes that hew to their common-law roots.180 A dispute is suited for
common-law adjudication if it is legal, retrospective, bilateral, and
constrained. By legal, I mean the admittedly fuzzy concept, distinct from
politics, involving the principled adjudication of disputes.181 By
retrospective, I mean that the court reviews past acts rather than
speculating on future behavior. By bilateral, I mean that the dispute
closely resembles the typical two-party adjudication (though it need not be
exactly two parties), in which a small number of interested players present
their facts and arguments in court through the adversarial process. And by
constrained, I mean that the decision primarily affects the parties to the
dispute, rather than spilling over on to non-appearing third parties.182
Notably, this analysis is agnostic about the source of law to be applied—
the routine interpretation of foreign law is something well within the
judicial competence. Further, there is no per se reason to think that foreign
public laws and acts of state are less amenable to judicial interpretation
than foreign private laws.183 Instead, this analysis depends on the nature of
the dispute and the institutional capacities of the branches.
In contrast to common-law adjudication, the political process is

180. In another context, Professor Huq has explained that this institutional appraisal has
“historical, pro-democracy, and efficiency foundations.” Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural
Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1468 (2013).
181. For a classic articulation of the law-politics distinction, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). See also Richard A. Posner,
Foreword: a Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2004) (contrasting political judging in
constitutional cases with “doing law”).
182. These last two limits call to mind Lon L. Fuller’s discussion of polycentric disputes in The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
183. See Dodge, Public Law Taboo, supra note 12 (making these and other arguments in favor of
judicial review of foreign public law).
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calibrated to produce stable systemic responses to higher stakes,
polycentric disputes.184 Parties set courts’ agendas by bringing individual
disputes when they are ripe for adjudication. But individual parties do not
necessarily have the incentive to request a systemic ruling when it would
be in the social interest.185 Political branches set their own agendas, thus
overcoming this constraint. Similarly, while courts depend on parties to
present relevant facts,186 political branches have broader access to
information and expertise. This is particularly important in cases with
significant spillovers, as many affected parties would not be represented in
court187 and the litigating parties’ incentives may not correlate with
systemic incentives.188 The political branches—more so than individual
judges or the private litigants that appear before them—are repeat players
in both international relations and the separation of powers, giving them
both better information and an incentive to think more holistically about
these cases and their consequences. Trading off individual versus social
interests, for example, not only sounds in politics more than in law, but
also depends on information and judgment beyond what the parties to a
case may have at hand.189 All of these reasons argue for the political
branches to take the lead on systemic and polycentric cases. If this sounds
familiar, it should: Article III doctrines such as standing, the case or
controversy requirement, and the political question doctrine may be
understood as tracking this division of labor.190
This institutional-capacity analysis also feeds back into earlier
questions in this Article. The threshold decisions whether to incorporate
foreign law and whether to sit in judgment are among those systemic
issues within the capacity of the political branches. It may be, for example,
that there are situations in which the international consequences are so

184. Administrative-law doctrines like Chevron rely in part on the differences between political
and judicial process described here. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
185. This insight, for example, drives concerns with nonparty preclusion and motivates
aggregation rules like the class action and mandatory joinder.
186. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649,
673-75 (2000) (praising executive flexibility vis-à-vis the courts)
187. Relatedly, a court adjudicating a low-value foreign judgment should not be inundated with
experts and amici worried that the outcome could affect every possible future judgment from that
foreign jurisdiction.
188. See Clopton, Transnational Class Actions, supra note 20 (discussing this concern in another
context).
189. This approach tracks Professor Brilmayer’s critique of judicial conflict-of-laws rules. See
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS at 181–84 (1990).
190. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 178 (making some of these arguments with respect to standing and
the structural constitution).
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severe that U.S. courts should not sit in judgment at all.191 But the
determination of which issues are most sensitive is itself a polycentric,
multidimensional, political inquiry. The parties to an individual act of state
case, for example, lack the information or incentives to represent the
relevant social interests that are at stake in a decision whether to adopt or
abolish that doctrine.192
Finally, and again, note that comity and foreign-affairs exceptionalism
are not necessary for this institutional-capacity analysis. The judiciary is
equally disadvantaged in domestic and international polycentric disputes.
And while the political branches may have different priorities or interests
in foreign affairs, and they may gather data from different sources, their
participation in regulation and litigation is not unique to international
cases. International law (distinct from international comity) may
differentiate some international cases.193 But international law’s relevance
is also unexceptional as it is within the authority and capacity of the
political branches to create international law and it is within the authority
and capacity of the courts to interpret and apply it.194
C. Federalism
Federalism is a second structural factor that may offer guidance for
sitting in judgment. Foreign-affairs federalism cases like Zschernig v.
Miller directly implicate the federal-state balance,195 and many comity
decisions have deep federalism roots.196 In keeping with the prior sections’
attempts to imagine unexceptional transnational law, this Section
considers sitting-in-judgment cases as subject to normal federalism
analysis.
Turning first to institutional authority, the Constitution seems to answer
many of the relevant sitting-in-judgment questions. The Supremacy Clause
directs that federal law and treaties preempt state law, so to the extent that
sitting-in-judgment issues are resolved in those enactments, state law takes
a back seat.197 The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, for example, takes

191. For example, Congress has declared that litigation against foreign sovereigns outside of a
narrow set of exceptions is inappropriate for U.S. courts. See supra notes 54–55 (citing FSIA).
192. This logic augurs against judicial abstention—if abstention is appropriate, the political
branches can so declare. See infra note 233 (discussing why it may be easier to overturn judicial action
rather than inaction).
193. For further discussion of international law, see infra notes 230–237.
194. See infra notes 230–232 and accompanying text (discussing international law).
195. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
196. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 18.
197. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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much foreign-sovereign litigation out of state courts and moves it to
federal courts.198 Federal common law also controls in state courts, and
therefore the act of state doctrine199 and common-law immunity200 apply
equally in state and federal cases. Looking ahead, on issues from judgment
recognition201 to forum non conveniens202 to forum selection,203 there have
been calls for uniform federal rules applicable in federal and state courts—
often deriving their substance from international law.204
Institutional capacity concerns also shed light on federalism in sittingin-judgment cases. Consider first those federalism challenges that involve
the political branches. If we were to have a statute on forum selection,
should it be federal or state?205 In these cases, capacity seems to line up
with authority. There are plausible arguments that the federal branches are
more and better informed, more experienced, and less enthralled with
parochial incentives than the state actors.206 Within constitutional limits,207
the federal government has the power to decide which issues fit those
categories.208
Turning to the federal courts, however, it is not obvious that federalcourt judges would be any more expert, or have access to any better
information, than their state-court counterparts in adjudicating disputes
involving foreign acts. Federal and state judges alike rely on parties to
present information and then apply existing law to facts. Extant doctrines
modulate which cases end up in state and federal courts209—reflecting an
independent set of considerations210—and it does not seem that there

198. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. This federal court move, of course, is subject
to Article III limits. See supra note 55 (discussing World Watch v. American Airlines).
199. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 59 and accompanying text.
201. E.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006).
202. E.g., Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in
International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 501, 524–28 (1993).
203. Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 629 (2011).
204. For example, the potential federal statute on forum selection, see id., would implement The
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98.
205. See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
206. But see Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
649 (2002) (challenging the view that federal control of foreign affairs is necessary because of the
externalities that would result from state action).
207. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
208. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text (discussing Supremacy Clause). Consistent
with previous comments about polycentric disputes, similar arguments would favor federal political
branches over state court lawmaking in these cases. See supra Part III.B.
209. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. §§  1330–1369 (2012).
210. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 308 (2005);
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should be a special rule for cases with a sitting-in-judgment element.211 Of
course, were Congress to conclude that on a particular class of cases
federal judges were preferred, it has wide latitude to create federal-court
jurisdiction in those cases.212 But as a general matter, institutional capacity
does not seem to answer the federal- versus state-court question for
individual case resolution.
A somewhat different analysis applies when courts are operating in a
lawmaking role, such as when they announce a common-law rule for acts
of state.213 Again, it is not obvious that the federal courts should win out
based on information or expertise.214 However, with respect to judicial
lawmaking, the federal courts have the built-in institutional advantage of
uniformity, as federal common law rules apply in state and federal
courts.215 The so-called “one voice” in foreign affairs federalism has been
justifiably criticized,216 but the core idea that a uniform approach is
preferred in some cases is uncontestable. Assimilating this insight into
existing jurisprudence, the uniformity interest should justify federal law
displacing state law when courts are making law in these areas.217
A final federalism battleground involves lawmaking by federal courts
versus state political branches.218 In these circumstances, the federal courts
retain their uniformity advantage when making common law,219 but state
political branches possess those capacities that favored political-branch

Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justification for
Federal Jurisdictions over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1996).
211. Cf. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (finding federal-court
jurisdiction because “Plaintiffs’ state law claims, if well-pleaded, raise issues of international relations
which implicate federal common law”).
212. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. §§  1330–1369.
213. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
216. See David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2014) (collecting sources). I
have argued elsewhere that federalism’s one voice and separation of power’s one voice can find accord
in the narrow set of cases within the President’s exclusive authority. See Zachary D. Clopton, Foreign
Affairs Federalism and the Limits on Executive Power, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1
(2012).
217. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986); Stephen B. Burbank,
Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2002). This is
not to say that every sitting-in-judgment issue demands a federal solution—indeed, this Article stands
in contrast to foreign-affairs exceptionalism. See supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text.
218. For further discussion, see generally Zachary D. Clopton & P. Bartholomew Quintans,
Extraterritoriality and Comparative Institutional Analysis: A Response to Professor Meyer, 102
GEORGETOWN L.J. ONLINE 28 (2013) (responding to Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law:
Does the Common Law Apply Abroad?, 102 GEORGETOWN L.J. 301 (2014)).
219. See supra notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
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resolution of polycentric disputes in the previous Section.220 These
questions thus involve difficult institutional balancing, though at a
minimum they suggest that perhaps federal courts should be slightly
warier of making federal common law in areas primarily populated by
state statutes (rather than state common-law rules).221
In sum, federalism requires an additional layer of institutional
sensitivity.222 We cannot simply adopt a one-size-fits-all answer to federal
versus state, but instead we should ask about particular federal and state
branches acting in particular capacities.
D. Judicial Approaches
This Part so far has focused on the vertical and horizontal divisions in
sitting-in-judgment cases. This division has relied on structural
considerations to suggest that only certain types of disputes are natural fits
for courts. These same structural considerations also could offer guidance
to courts about how they should exercise their authority to sit in judgment
on foreign acts when called upon.
To begin with, for capacity and authority reasons, courts may look to
the political branches for guidance on how to sit in judgment. As noted
above, if Congress and the President rule foreign acts valid or excludable,
courts, as faithful agents, should enforce these decisions. Moreover, the
political branches may provide guidance on specific modalities, including
reciprocity rules223 or other standards.224 Institutional capacity
considerations also remind courts to focus their judgments on the parties
who can provide the court with accurate information and who have the
proper incentives to do so—the more spillovers to nonparties, the more
political the decision will be.225
One feature of judicial rather than legislative resolution is the authority
and competence to account for individual circumstances in individual
cases—and sitting-in-judgment doctrine that is exclusively outward

220. See supra notes 182–188 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 213–215 (discussing federal common law).
222. Although sometimes applying simple federalism principles like preemption might avoid the
tough foreign-relations questions, as Professor Ramsey observed, at other times invocations of
“comity” have made controversial cases seem conventional. See Ramsey, supra note 18 (discussing, in
particular, Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997), and Torres
v. Southern Peru Copper Co., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997)).
223. See infra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing reciprocity).
224. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing information asymmetries). Indeed, for
the same authority and capacity reasons, the political branches should be encouraged to provide this
guidance when possible.
225. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing settled expectations).
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focused may ignore these concerns. For example, with respect to these
individual interests, courts should not give their imprimatur to foreign acts
that shock the conscience.226 This observation is both commonsensical and
consistent with many (though not all) existing doctrines in this area.
Intersecting with this consideration is the notion of consent. Earlier
discussions have suggested that honoring foreign acts furthers individual
interests in predictability—individuals should be able to rely on law
(foreign and domestic) when doing business abroad, negotiating
international contracts, and choosing where to bring a transnational
lawsuit.227 That justification is particularly strong when the individual
against whom the act is enforced consented to it. Thus, it should take an
even more shocking outcome to overturn foreign acts to which a party
consented. In addition, U.S. courts concerned about individual interests
must be conscious of the consequences that stem from their decisions.
Some of the doctrines described above involve courts compelling parties
to take certain actions abroad—for example, compliance with a U.S.
discovery order.228 The foreign-law assessment in such a case involves
considering whether the order would cause the party to violate foreign law
and thus subject itself to foreign consequences. But courts have the
capacity to judge these consequences independent of their sovereign
status: It is the future harm, not its sovereign roots, that should worry
courts.229
Courts applying the institutional approach described above need not be
blind to international considerations—indeed, international law can be
useful in achieving many of these goals. International law is the product of
political branch choice—treaties are formally ratified by the political
process,230 and customary international law requires state compliance from
legal obligation.231 Courts are competent to determine the content of

226. Indeed, for this reason, many interjurisdictional doctrines are subject to public policy
exceptions. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“A contractual
choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public
policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”);
Victor v. Sperry, 329 P.2d 728, 732–33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (public policy and choice of law);
UFCMJRA § 4(b)(3) (public-policy exception to judgment recognition).
227. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
229. This inquiry parallels domestic doctrines such as the irreparable harm standard for injunctive
relief. E.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). As such, it is within judicial
competence and not foreignact-specific.
230. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”)
231. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, 1060 (identifying as a source of law “international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law”); North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment (Ger./Neth.; Ger./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 77
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international law, and courts presume that the political branches intend to
follow international legal rules (while acknowledging the power of those
branches to deviate from or change those rules).232 International law also
serves individual interests. International legal rules are stable and
predictable; they provide notice to potentially affected parties; and, at least
in the aggregate, they are unlikely to be significantly out of step with
forum public policy.233
Both jurisdictional and substantive international law may be relevant in
these cases. The international law of jurisdiction defines the reach of a
state’s laws, judicial acts, and enforcement authority.234 When addressing
the reach of a foreign state, a court could treat its acts as extending no
further than international law allows.235 This judgment reflects the
authority of the political branches manifested in international law. It also
protects individual interests, not only because international jurisdictional
law is ascertainable, but also because the international law bases for
jurisdiction track intuitive concepts of notice to individuals.236 For these
institutional and individual reasons, therefore, one aspect of sitting in
judgment could be an assessment of whether the foreign act complies with
international jurisdictional law. The same arguments also suggest
substantive international law limits on foreign incorporation. The political
branches implicitly reject violations of international law, and insulating
parties from international-law violations protects individual interests.

(Feb. 20) (“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such,
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”).
232. See, e.g, Kevin L. Cope, Congress’s International Legal Discourse, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1115
(2015) (describing extensive role of international law in domestic legislative debate).
233. What if U.S. courts get international law wrong? Turning traditional process arguments on
their head, one amicus curiae in Sabbatino suggested that foreign governments can use diplomatic
channels to influence U.S. policy change—rather than normal arguments suggesting that aggrieved
parties use diplomatic channels to seek redress. Brief for the Committee on International Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (No. 16),1963 WL 105634. Correcting judicial errors against foreign
states may be easier than seeking redress from a foreign government or party via the U.S. State
Department. See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge Jr., Congressional Overrides
of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1376–77
(2014) (noting the Executive Branch’s high success rate in seeking congressional overrides of adverse
Supreme Court decisions).
234. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 401–88 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
235. Cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416 (limiting act of state doctrine to acts within sovereign’s
territory).
236. For example, individuals should understand that if they take actions with effects within a
foreign state, then they could be subject to its laws. The international law of prescriptive jurisdiction
(which applies to legislative acts) reaches not only a sovereign’s territory and citizenship but also
“counduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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Therefore, if a foreign act violates substantive international law, U.S.
courts would be able to discredit it.237
In short, looking only at institutional considerations and structural
values, we can learn a lot about when and how U.S. institutions should sit
in judgment. Institutional capacity and authority drive the first cut of the
analysis. And, once sitting in judgment is on the table, courts may look to
structural considerations to decide individual cases on individual facts.
This approach would not render all international considerations moot, but
it would funnel those issues through traditional structural veins rather than
asking courts to make multifarious judgments about the nebulous notion of
international comity.
IV. APPLICATIONS
Part III of this Article explored a structural approach to sitting in
judgment, and this Part asks how that structural approach would apply to
the sitting-in-judgment cases described above. This Part begins with a
discussion of those topics for which U.S. courts already sit in judgment—
the foreign judgments, laws, systems, and interests described in Section
II.B. This Part then reconsiders those doctrines for which U.S. courts have
stayed their hands—acts of state, public laws, and foreign affairs
federalism. Again, the goal here is to assess what domestic institutional
analysis has to say about current law that claims to depend on external
considerations.
A. Judgments, Laws, Systems, and Interests
American courts routinely sit in judgment on foreign judgments, laws,
systems, and interests. What would the structural approach to foreign acts
tell us about these doctrines?
Foreign judgment recognition incorporates many of the relevant
considerations, so we begin there.238 The first insight is that judgmentrecognition decisions can be broken down into their constituent parts.
Current doctrine leaves the entire recognition question to courts, except on
the rare occasion that a statute or treaty plays a role.239 But institutional
capacity analysis shows that foreign judgment recognition is multifaceted

237. For an argument explaining the notice case for international-law violations, see Colangelo,
supra note 155. And for a discussion of jurisdictional and substantive international law as tools of
domestic statutory interpretation, see generally Clopton, Replacing, supra note 21.
238. See supra notes 102–127 and accompanying text (collecting examples).
239. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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in meaningful ways. Reviews of the specifics of foreign judgments
themselves (was this judgment procured by fraud?), and reviews of the
details of underlying foreign proceedings (was the defendant given notice
and an opportunity to be heard?), are the types of case-specific inquiries
that courts handle every day. Parties have the best information in these
situations, and they have the proper incentives to present such information
to the court.240
Meanwhile, current judgment-recognition doctrine also calls for courts
to pass judgments on foreign legal systems—can Nigeria produce fair
judgments at all?241 An institutional capacity analysis suggests that these
questions are in a different register. Private litigants likely have no special
insight into the general features of foreign legal systems; courts have no
special competence in evaluating those systems; and the political
branches, not tied to the vagaries of litigation, can offer stable systemic
judgments that respond to general welfare concerns, diplomatic
imperatives, and changing facts on the ground.242 The “country report”
approach from human rights243 and the state-listing approach from terrorist
financing244 are potential models for political-branch involvement in this
area. Of course, the federal political branches could delegate to the
judiciary, but the delegation would require judicially manageable
standards consonant with common-law adjudication.245
The last aspect of judgment recognition is the set of political choices
that define the parameters of judgment-recognition law. Reciprocity is the
best example.246 In judgment recognition, courts applying reciprocity
require a foreign state to enforce U.S. judgments as a prerequisite for
enforcing that state’s judgments. Putting aside whether reciprocity

240. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
242. Professor Whytock has argued that systemic due-process review is preferable to individualcase due-process review for judgment enforcement. Christopher A. Whytock, Some Cautionary Notes
on the ‘Chevronization’ of Transnational Litigation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 467, 480–81 (2013).
First, as explained infra, systemic review is valuable, but institutionally better suited for the political
branches. Second, Whytock acknowledges that individual due-process review is important, but
suggests that such review should occur in the rendering forum. This particular question of recognition
practice is beyond the scope of this Article.
243. See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(d) & 2304(b) (1961).
244. See supra note 161.
245. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
246. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. In addition to reciprocity requirements in
traditional judgment enforcement cases, reciprocity rules may be imported into other procedural
doctrines. For example, many U.S. courts will not certify class actions involving foreign plaintiffs if
those plaintiffs are citizens of countries that do not treat U.S. class judgments as binding. See Clopton,
Transnational Class Actions, supra note 20 (collecting cases and criticizing this practice).
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works,247 the adoption of a reciprocity requirement is itself a political
judgment: it affects the interests of many parties, not just the parties to a
particular enforcement proceeding; it requires information not readily
presented in an individual litigation or available to any two appearing
parties; and it involves the political tradeoff of individual interests versus
societal ones.248 Reciprocity requirements also may be linked with other
matters of foreign policy,249 and such rules may need updating on the
schedule of politics, not litigation. And yet, reciprocity rules have at times
been the product of judicial lawmaking,250 and many judgment-recognition
statutes give courts unfettered discretion to choose when reciprocity
matters.251 This need not be the case. Efforts to produce an international
judgments convention could be revived,252 or Congress could pass a
statute requiring (or rejecting) reciprocity, as the American Law Institute
has recommended.253 Either a treaty or a statute would convert reciprocity
from a system-wide inquiry to a foreign-law inquiry—has the foreign state
adopted the convention or not?—which is more properly left to the
courts.254
The structural approach also highlights a potential division when
incorporating foreign laws.255 When and if the political branches direct
courts to evaluate foreign laws in a particular way, those directions should

247. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Rethinking Judgments Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109 (2014).
248. A reciprocity requirement in the long run may lead to more enforceable judgments, but in the
near term it is not the fault of an individual litigant seeking recognition that the foreign state has
decided not to recognize U.S. judgments. See Dodge, Public Law Taboo, supra note 12 (articulating
this and other anti-reciprocity arguments).
249. Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and Credit Clause?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L.
595, 599 (2012) (noting that political branches “commonly enact legislation that singles out some
country or countries for special treatment, normally in exchange for promises of comparable special
treatment under the laws of those foreign states”).
250. E.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
251. FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(g) (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8505(2)(g) (2015); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.92 ([add either LexisNexis or West here] 2015); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (2015).
252. See, e.g., A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE
(JOHN J. BARCELÓ III & KEVIN M. CLERMONT EDS., 2002).
253. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT §7 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed
Council Draft 2002).
254. This is the approach of the New York Convention with respect to arbitration, and it has the
advantages of encouraging cooperation while dramatically simplifying the task of assessing
reciprocity. See U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I(3) (June 10, 1958). But see Yaad
Rotem, The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the Law of
Foreign Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 505 (2010) (suggesting that this task is more difficult
than it appears).
255. See supra notes 78–95 and accompanying text (collecting examples).
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be heeded.256 Individual interests also require state and federal courts
sitting in judgment on foreign laws to protect against unconscionable
results. Courts could reject foreign laws that trammel fundamental rights
not because of a generalized distaste for foreign public laws but because
courts are the guardians of the domestic judicial process. Consistent with
institutional prerogatives and individual rights, international substantive
and jurisdictional law may help set limits on foreign laws.257 Current
doctrines do not uniformly incorporate an international-law check, but
they could.
Before leaving the discussion of foreign laws, it is important to address
the risk of foreign states gaming the system. Knowing that U.S. courts will
incorporate foreign laws, what if foreign states pass laws to benefit their
citizens? The discovery and jurisdictional blocking statutes described
above may be examples of this phenomenon.258 A potential response
derives from international law principles, which themselves reflect
institutional and individual interests. International law in many forms
embodies a norm of nondiscrimination.259 Here, nondiscrimination
requires mutuality:260 The foreign law must not expressly target foreign
proceedings or foreign citizens. A U.S. court applying this rule would
reject a hypothetical law prohibiting French companies from disclosing
shareholder information to non-French courts, both because it does not
apply in French courts and because it treats French companies differently
from U.S. companies doing business in France. By applying mutuality,
U.S. courts can approximate which foreign laws are targeting U.S.
loopholes with a rule that is predictable to parties and consistent with
political-branch preferences expressed through international legal
agreement.261 And because the parties in these cases have the right

256. Professor Brilmayer thoughtfully explained why finality (among others) justifies treating
foreign judgments differently than foreign laws for purposes of recognition. Lea Brilmayer, Credit
Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 100 (1984). She may be correct, but this point is
orthogonal to the argument here—relevant doctrines may treat laws and judgments differently for
consequentialist or deontological reasons, but with respect to the “sitting in judgment” aspect of the
inquiry, the same considerations should apply.
257. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 401–88 (AM. LAW INST.1987)
258. See supra notes 96–97.
259. Consider, for example, the principle of national treatment embodied in Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation treaties and international trade agreements. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, The
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
302 (2013) (collecting sources and discussing these treaties).
260. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 187 (discussing mutuality).
261. One problem with this approach is the risk of selective enforcement in foreign states—
facially neutral laws will be enforced to game the system. However, shifting foreign gamesmanship
from legislation to enforcement increases the costs on foreign states because it requires the
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incentives to raise these issues (and judicial determinations need not
extend beyond the case at bar), courts are well positioned to apply the
mutuality rule.262
Judgments about foreign legal systems263 also fit the model of political
branch resolution. Much of this case was articulated above with respect to
judgment recognition, and the same logic applies to legal-system
judgments for forum non conveniens and other doctrines of this type.264
The need for stable judgments about legal systems also augurs in favor of
a federal solution—although states can adopt their own judgment
recognition and forum non conveniens approaches, perhaps the federal
political branches should make the necessary judgments about foreign
legal systems.265 Justice Scalia was right when he observed that current
forum non conveniens doctrine “make[s] uniformity and predictability of
outcome almost impossible.”266 At least with respect to its system-wide
aspects, the federal political branches have the capacity and authority to do
better.
Finally, for similar reasons, more of the consideration of foreign
interests could be left to the political branches.267 For example, perhaps the
federal political branches rather than federal courts should decide whether
foreign-relations issues are sufficient to demand federal-court
jurisdiction.268 Of particular note here is the role of foreign state
participation in private litigation. In various areas, U.S. courts have been
known to expressly or impliedly credit nonauthoritative foreign statements
of interest.269 These statements present two challenges for courts. First,
when they relate to foreign interests, these statements are the result of a
diplomatic calculation that presumably is political.270 Second, there are

coordination of more parties. Further, we might think that conversion from de jure to de facto
discrimination is valuable if it makes it more likely that de facto discrimination will be overruled or if
it sends an expressive signal about equal treatment.
262. To say that courts can apply a mutuality rule is, of course, different than saying that courts
should adopt mutuality rules on their own. That is where comparative institutionalism and
international law come into play.
263. See supra notes 112–130 and accompanying text (collecting examples).
264. See supra notes 241–245 and accompanying text.
265. It is not that state courts are incompetent in international litigation, and indeed the structural
approach calls for a reexamination of Zschernig. See infra Part IV.B. Instead, the concern is that courts
are not competent to judge foreign legal systems.
266. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994).
267. See supra notes 131–136 and accompanying text (collecting examples).
268. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing Sequihua).
269. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010) (noting foreign state
objections to interference with foreign securities regulation via amicus briefs); Sequihua v. Texaco,
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 64 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (referring to Ecuador’s “strong objection”).
270. Of course, the State Department would be free to include such views in statements of interest
in U.S. courts. See, e.g., BORN & RUTLDGE, supra note 100, at 55–56l

Washington University Open Scholarship

44

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 94:1

reasons to doubt the veracity of these statements. As low cost
interventions, foreign state participation may not accurately reflect the
magnitude and direction of foreign state interest. And because foreign
states are not repeat players in court—at least in the same way as they are
in international diplomacy—they have weak reputational incentives.271 If
U.S. courts announced in advance that such statements were inadmissible,
then perhaps it would discourage parties from spending resources and
exercising leverage to obtain such statements.272
B. Acts of State, Public Laws, and Preemption
This Section addresses cases in which U.S. courts have declined to sit
in judgment: acts of state, public laws, and foreign-affairs preemption.
Wholesale incorporation (acts of state) or abstention (public laws and
federalism) is inconsistent with the structural approach. New doctrine thus
may be appropriate.
With respect to the act of state doctrine,273 the structural approach
suggests that we should be dubious of the courts’ conclusion that sitting in
judgment on foreign sovereign acts is somehow more disrespectful than
any number of other judgments.274 Whether to have an act of state doctrine
at all is a political question. In the (likely) absence of such political branch
action, courts face a difficult decision about whether the cure of abolishing
the doctrine would be worse than the disease.275 Without taking sides on
this question, the structural approach suggests certain cases in which
courts should pare back existing act of state protections in furtherance of
the separation of powers.276 When Congress legislates that the act of state
doctrine does not apply to expropriations, it should not.277 Further, lower

271. As noted above, the federal political branches are repeat players in litigation and thus have
credibility constraints absent from foreign-state (and private) parties. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 178 at
1443 (making a similar argument in structural constitution cases). For example, in some cases, foreign
states have been known to change their positions on the interpretation of local law, seemingly with the
intent to influence the outcome of litigation in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Paul S. Vicary, Note, Comity, Act
of State, and Interpretation of Foreign Law: the Eleventh Circuit Missteps in McNab v. United States,
16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 925 (2004) (collecting cases).
272. Cf. Childress III, supra note 18 (arguing for more such statements).
273. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine).
274. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing Sequihua).
275. It may be that the act of state doctrine’s decades-long history justifies it as a result of settled
party expectations, changing international law, or political branch acquiescence.
276. Although some act of state decisions claim to rely on separation-of-powers arguments to
avoid sitting in judgment, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918), current doctrine
does not always respect separation-of-powers interests when expressed by the political branches.
277. See supra note 177 (citing Second Hickenlooper Amendment). Indeed, courts applying this
approach may reconsider whether political branch preference expressed in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act should trump the act of state doctrine in areas in which it creates federal-court
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court decisions that have used the act of state doctrine (separate from
sovereign immunity) to insulate foreign states from compliance with
federal statutes should be reversed.278 Perhaps more controversially, when
the Executive Branch suggests that the doctrine does not apply (the
Bernstein exception),279 when the United States government is the
plaintiff,280 when the underlying foreign act violates international
jurisdictional or substantive law,281 or when state political branches
legislate in the area,282 structural analysis suggests that U.S. courts should
decline to credit the foreign act. Although these limitations may be
normatively appealing, the argument here is institutional—the political
branches, not some normative priors, may dictate when the act of state
doctrine does not apply.
Turning to public laws, the reflexive rejection of public-law claims and
public-law judgments is also inconsistent with institutional analysis.283
Because of the sensitive due process and separation-of-powers interests in
criminal law, it would not be unreasonable for U.S. courts to decline those
cases.284 But when foreign laws address public-law topics such as
securities fraud, employment discrimination, or consumer protection,
particularly through mechanisms of private enforcement,285 U.S. courts
could hear those cases consistent with individual rights and international
law. And if those assessments of foreign public laws are too
uncomfortable, then the political branches could say so—statutes, treaties,
and executive participation are always available.
Finally, the doctrine of foreign-affairs preemption from Zschernig v.
Miller represents another case in which the courts substituted their

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359
(9th Cir. 1981); Fogade v. ENB Revocable Trust, 263 F.3d 1274, 1293 (11th Cir. 2001).
278. See supra note 48 (collecting sources). This conclusion accords with Professor Harrison,
supra note 47, though it is based on institutional considerations rather than Harrison’s historical and
doctrinal ones.
279. See supra note 175 (citing Bernstein).
280. See, e.g., United States v. One Etched Ivory Tusk of African Elephant, 871 F. Supp. 2d 128
(E.D.N.Y. 2012); United States v. Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v.
Labs of Va., Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Of course, these suits would be subject to
statutory and constitutional constraints.
281. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text (discussing role of international law).
282. While Sabbatino suggested that states can adopt stricter act of state rules, Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 n.23 (1964), this Article’s approach suggests that federal courts
should adopt a common-law rule that incorporates stricter or looser state legislative standards. For an
example of federal common law incorporating state law, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440
U.S. 715 (1979).
283. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (collecting examples).
284. See supra note 34 (citing penal exception).
285. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
637 (2013).
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judgment for that of the political branches.286 The statute in Zschernig
reflected the policy judgment of state political branches.287 To make
matters worse from an institutional perspective, the United States
government expressly disclaimed the position that the Oregon statute
“unduly interfere[d] with the United States’ conduct of foreign
relations.”288 Instead, an approach that vindicated institutional and
individual interests would allow state political branches to make political
judgments that happen to touch on foreign affairs. Those state rules should
respect the institutional capacities of the branches—e.g., avoid situations
in which courts make unconstrained, systemic judgments about foreign
states or foreign relations.289 The state rules also must be subject to federal
political constraints. States cannot abrogate treaties or reverse preemptive
federal statutes,290 and courts should not be able to stay litigation in
defense of federal foreign affairs interests when the federal government
expressly disclaims those interests. And, of course, state political
judgments would have to comport with constitutional protections for
individual rights.291
V.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to Sabbatino, Zschernig, and Judge Learned Hand, U.S.
courts routinely sit in judgment on foreign judgments, laws, legal systems,
and interests. This Article has cataloged myriad doctrines that involve
sitting in judgment, from forum non conveniens to foreign law as datum to
foreign states as amici in private litigation. In each of these areas, U.S.
courts evaluate foreign sovereign acts and are willing to deem them
unsuitable for credit in a U.S. court. The fact that these doctrines are
widespread, uncontroversial, and commonsensical undermines claims that
international comity demands that courts stay their hands—either to
incorporate every foreign public act or none. Not only do these doctrines

286. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing Zschernig).
287. Note that the state courts in Zschernig ostensibly followed statutory direction to consider the
individualized inquiry regarding “the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon
estates ‘without confiscation.’” Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 431 (1968) (quoting OR. REV.
STAT. § 111.070 (1957)).
288. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6 n.5, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968) (no. 21), 1967 WL 113577.
289. If the Zschernig statute required courts to deem certain foreign states to be serial
expropriators generally, that might be a different story.
290. U.S. CONST. art. V.
291. Similar institutional arguments caution against courts reading potentially extraterritorial
legislation too narrowly. For further elaboration of this point, see generally Clopton, Replacing, supra
note 21.
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fail to line up with comity, they do not need to. Instead, a structural
approach to sitting in judgment reminds us that institutional and individual
interests matter too. A structural approach suggests that institutional
capacity and authority can help assign responsibility for sitting in
judgment and crafting the relevant standards to the authorized and
institutionally capable branches. And it suggests that legislative and
executive choices may join with individual rights to produce predictable
and consistent doctrinal standards.
A perennial question in transnational litigation is what, if anything, is
distinctive from domestic litigation. This Article suggests two potential
answers: foreign law and international law. First, tracking the observation
of Professor Baumgartner, international litigation is different because it
may require courts to consider and incorporate foreign law.292 For reasons
of fairness, predictability, efficiency, and authority, U.S. courts can and
should incorporate foreign law in a host of doctrinal contexts. Second,
tracking the observation of Professor Burbank, international litigation may
be normatively distinctive if and when it relies on international law.293
This Article was explicit on how (and why) international law has a place
in these cases—it can define institutional authority, set substantive limits
on U.S. decisions, and inform judicial interpretations of both foreign and
domestic acts, to name a few.294
At the same time, these distinctions should not be taken too far. First, it
is true that in transnational litigation U.S. courts account for foreign legal
acts, but they ways that U.S. courts account for those acts are consistent
with other sources. A U.S. court may stay litigation to allow for foreign
adjudication,295 but the same court may wait for private negotiation to
resolve the dispute.296 A party may be excused from contract performance
because a change in foreign law made performance impracticable,297 but
she also may be excused if an earthquake did the same.298 And a U.S.
court may enforce a foreign judgment,299 but it also may enforce a
domestic arbitral award.300

292. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation in the United States: The Emergence of a
New Field of Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 793 (2007).
293. Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1473–97 (1991).
294. See supra notes 230–237 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
296. Courts often stay proceeding in light of formal alternative dispute resolution or even informal
settlement discussions.
297. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
298. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Act of God § 3 (2005).
299. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
300. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–6 (2012).
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Second, with respect to international law, it is true that U.S. courts seek
guidance from international legal norms in transnational litigation. But
international law can be understood as one of many ways that political
branch preferences are expressed and individual rights are protected.
Treaties could create exceptions to the act of state doctrine and set
reciprocity rules for judgment recognition,301 but purely domestic statutes
could do the same.302 American courts could refuse to credit foreign acts
that violate substantive international law,303 but they also could refuse to
credit foreign acts that violate the Constitution.304 And while international
law may be a source of substantive and procedural norms,305 it is far from
unique in this function.
In sum, to the extent transnational litigation is different, it is different
in the details. The content of international law may be different than
domestic law, but the constitutional allocation of lawmaking authority is
transsubstantive. The content of foreign law may be different than
contracts, but courts should account for real world conditions and
consequences in all cases. For foreign-affairs reasons, sitting in judgment
may be problematic in certain contexts, but the process of identifying
those situations and creating doctrines to manifest those conclusions need
not be any different than in domestic law and policy.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra notes 170–172, 178, 254 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64, 179 and accompanying text.
See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment cases).
See supra note 234–237 and accompanying text.
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